BAMAKO — On Thursday, October 1, the official start of the 2026-2027 school year in Mali was proclaimed with pomp and ambition. Transitional President General Assimi Goïta declared it the “Year of Education and Culture.” But behind the official slogan lies a stark, painful truth: more than 2,400 schools will not reopen their doors nationwide, depriving over 730,000 children of instruction and exposing the strategic deadlock of the military junta in Bamako.
How armed groups turned schools into targets
More than one in five schools across Mali is now defunct. This education breakdown is not accidental; it stems directly from the gradual territorial expansion of armed terrorist groups. School buildings are looted or set ablaze by Islamist katibas that reject so-called “Western” education, and many have been converted into makeshift shelters for thousands of internally displaced people. The pattern of closures maps a geography of state retreat. In the far northern Kidal region, nearly 84% of schools remain shut. In neighboring Ménaka, where Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) commits abuses, 52% of schools in the academy are deemed “non-functional.” The situation is similarly dire in Gao and central districts such as Mopti and Bandiagara, as well as parts of Ségou and Koulikoro, now directly threatened by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM, Al-Qaeda-affiliated).
Behind the junta’s failing strategy
For the transitional authorities, who built much of their legitimacy on promises to restore national sovereignty and security, these figures are a harsh rebuke. Since the coups of 2020 and 2021, the junta has radically shifted its geopolitical stance, breaking with traditional partners: expelling French Barkhane forces, ending the UN mission (MINUSMA), and scrapping the Algiers peace accord. To fill the void, Bamako turned to Russian military support and Africa Corps mercenaries (formerly Wagner). Yet the promised swift military reconquest has turned into a series of dramatic setbacks. Despite the highly publicized recapture of Kidal in late 2023, Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian auxiliaries have bogged down in bloody wars of attrition. The resounding defeat at Tinzaouatène in summer 2024 against rebels and GSIM fighters marked a turning point, exposing structural weaknesses in the junta’s military setup. Far from containing the threat, this purely security-focused approach triggered devastating reprisals from terrorist groups, which intensified operations beyond their traditional northern and central strongholds, striking at the heart of institutions—such as the spectacular attacks on the Faladié gendarmerie school and Bamako military airport in September 2024.
The map of encirclement: Mali’s fractured territory
Today, an analysis of control over Malian territory reveals a sovereignty largely in tatters. In the far north—covering Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit—the state retains only an island-like presence, confined to heavily fortified administrative centers. ISGS controls vast desert stretches of Ménaka, imposing its rule and collecting zakat from locals, while GSIM and various armed groups vie for border routes with Mauritania and Algeria. In the center—including Mopti, Ségou, and San, considered the beating heart of the GSIM insurgency through Katiba Macina—rural areas almost entirely escape government control. Insurgents enforce regular blockades on entire towns like Niono or Djenné and mandate the closure of public schools under threat of targeted executions of teachers. Finally, in the south and west—notably Koulikoro, Sikasso, and Kayes, once spared—a rapid infiltration is underway. GSIM sleeper cells orchestrate economic blockades, particularly targeting fuel and major roads, progressively choking supplies to the capital.
A lost generation
Against this general deterioration, the gap between official rhetoric and daily life for Malians has never been more glaring. While transitional leaders celebrate the country’s “refoundation,” access to knowledge—a fundamental right—continues to recede dramatically. Each closed school hands another ideological victory to obscurantist groups, which find in this idle youth a fertile recruiting ground. The “Year of Education” proclaimed in Bamako may well become, for hundreds of thousands of young Malians, another blank year amid the din of weapons.
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