The relevance of formalizing religious practice?
In Senegal, religion extends beyond the private sphere, actively contributing to social cohesion, conflict resolution, education, and at times, political governance. Despite this pervasive influence, the relationship between the State and religious communities largely operates on informal grounds. This raises a crucial question: can the institutionalization of religious affairs help transcend clientelism without undermining the nation’s secular principles? Perhaps the core inquiry is no longer whether to formalize State-religious ties, but rather how to achieve this without institutionalizing religion itself.
First, we must dispel a common misconception: institutionalizing the relationship between the State and religious communities does not automatically equate to making religion a state matter. Several African nations have already opted to establish public bodies dedicated to Religious Affairs.
Mali, for instance, operates a Ministry of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs, while Guinea has a General Secretariat for Religious Affairs. Côte d’Ivoire also maintains a specific administration for religious worship. Morocco has taken this institutionalization much further through its Superior Council of Ulemas and the role of Amir Al-Mouminine.
Senegal, too, possesses an initial framework for institutionalization. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and Integration of Arabic Language Graduates in April 2024 marked a significant first step. Its director, Djim Dramé, openly states that the objective is precisely to “formalize relations between the State and religions” and to foster peace, harmony, and coexistence. Therefore, the current debate revolves less around the necessity of an administration for religious matters and more about the extent of institutionalization Senegal wishes to implement.
Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé views the announced transformation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs into a General Delegation as a “positive evolution” and an “institutional elevation.” His argument is particularly compelling: “religion is a resource in our country,” notably for social cohesion and the adoption of public policies.
Given that religion already serves as a vital social, cultural, and even political resource for Senegal, why persist in managing its relationship with the State primarily through personal connections, courtesy visits, ad-hoc delegations, and situational arrangements? It is within this context that Ousmane Sonko’s proposal should be understood.
He advocates for a genuine institutionalization of State-religious community relations, structured around several key suggestions: creating a budget for religious affairs, upgrading the Delegation for Religious Affairs to a Secretary of State or a full ministry, officially recognizing certain provisions granted to religious leaders, and regulating special funds through a sworn commission.
A “collaboration-based secularism between politics and religion”
The rationale is clear: to move away from a system of discretionary favors towards predefined rights and regulations. When a religious leader receives an administrative concession due to proximity to the President, it is a favor. However, if the same concession is governed by a formal text, with clearly defined conditions applicable to all leaders meeting the same criteria, it becomes an institutional process. Thus, the State’s role should not be to control religion, but to establish a framework for organizing its interactions with it.
Senegal is a secular state. This constitutional reality cannot be circumvented or diminished. The Constitution affirms that the Republic is secular, democratic, and social, ensuring equality for all citizens regardless of religion and respecting all beliefs. Therefore, institutionalizing religious affairs cannot lead to any form of state religion.
However, the question arises whether secularism prohibits the State from organizing its relations with religions. Political science professor Maurice Soudieck Dione demonstrates that Senegalese secularism has a unique history. It does not precisely align with the strict French model of separation. He describes it as a “collaboration-based secularism between politics and religion.” The distinctiveness of the Senegalese model lies in its operation through a “pragmatic accommodation” with brotherhoods and the Church.
Nevertheless, the debate cannot be oversimplified to: “since religion holds a significant place in society, a Ministry of Worship must be created.” Seydou Ka, a journalist-columnist for Le Soleil, rightly warns against the risk of transforming secularism into a form of administrative control over religious matters. He expresses concern about a “bureaucratization of the sacred” and a drift towards “laicism” that could erode the autonomy of religious leaders.
This observation is fundamental, as there is a clear distinction between institutionalizing relations with religions and institutionalizing religions themselves. In the former case, the State establishes an administrative interlocutor. In the latter, it gradually begins to define legitimacy, who can speak on behalf of a community, which activities are permitted, how places of worship should operate, and which religious leaders qualify for public recognition.
The fear of a “bureaucratization of the sacred”
The State’s desire to organize religions themselves presents an obvious risk and could fundamentally alter their nature. Researcher Bakary Sambe perfectly summarized the danger of the political-religious relationship in Senegal. He observes that “our leaders seek in religion a legitimacy they lack in politics.” The peril of institutionalization would be precisely to transform an already clientelistic relationship into a bureaucratized form of clientelism. Instead of politicians occasionally seeking religious blessings, permanent mechanisms for distributing public resources could emerge.
It is precisely because these risks exist that institutionalization appears necessary. Currently, a significant portion of the interactions between the State and religious authorities is personalized. A president maintains a particular relationship with a certain Khalife. A minister is close to a specific religious family. A community more easily secures certain investments due to its religious influence.
A major religious event receives special support. The question then becomes: is it better to leave these practices informal or subject them to public rules? In my view, institutionalizing them is preferable. However, with an important caveat: we must not institutionalize faith; we must institutionalize the State’s relationship with religious realities.
This perspective aligns with Djim Dramé’s assertion that the Directorate of Religious Affairs aims to listen to “all religious sensibilities” and to formalize State-religious relations. The National Council of Laity has also expressed support for this approach, viewing the Directorate as a potentially effective interface between the Church and the State. Its president, Philippe Abraham Tine, emphasized the need to clearly explain the structure’s role to prevent misunderstandings. This interfaith dimension is crucial.
Senegal is a profoundly religious society. Muslims constitute a vast majority, while Christian communities boast a considerable historical and social presence. This socio-historical reality warrants an institutional response. If the State supports citizens in education, health, culture, or sports, why should it treat religious matters as a reality it can never institutionally acknowledge?
A public policy for religious matters
The State can support pilgrimages, contribute to the security of major religious events, foster training, participate in the renovation of certain places of worship, or assist religious institutions, provided that rules are transparent and the same principles of equity are applied. Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé specifically highlights the objective of supporting “Muslim, Christian, and traditional religious communities” in their worship and development. Fundamentally, Ousmane Sonko’s proposal initiates a debate far more significant than a mere administrative question.
It compels Senegal to critically examine its unique model of secularism. Seydou Ka reminds us of the risk of bureaucratizing the sacred. Étienne Smith encourages us to consider “proportional equidistance.” Seydi Diamil Niane stresses the necessity of institutionalizing relations between public authorities and religious leaders. Maurice Soudieck Dione demonstrates a distinct collaboration between the political and the religious spheres.
The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso each illustrate various approaches to organizing these relationships. Sonko, however, poses another fundamental question: why continue to manage through favor what could be governed by law? This is where the true merit of his proposal lies. Provided, of course, that a critical error is avoided: institutionalizing religious practice must not mean nationalizing religion. The State must remain secular. Religions must retain their autonomy. And citizens must be free to practice their faith.
Therefore, I would not necessarily advocate for a “Ministry of Religion,” which might convey the impression that the State is managing spiritual affairs. Instead, I would champion a republican institution tasked with transparently and equitably organizing the relations between the State and religious denominations. For Senegal cannot pretend that religion does not exist.
The question, then, is no longer whether to institutionalize religious matters, but how to do so without losing the unique character of Senegalese secularism. And in my opinion, the correct answer lies in one principle: do not institutionalize faith. Institutionalize the relationship with faith. This is the only path to reconcile republican secularism, religious freedom, confessional equity, and the autonomy of religious communities.
Khaly Sarr
