The Russian Africa Corps is strategically repositioning its personnel, withdrawing fighters from Mali’s northern territories to bolster defenses around the capital and protect the ruling junta. This pivotal shift emphasizes providing aerial support and critical intelligence to Malian soldiers engaged in ground operations.
Observers note a transition to a more supportive, less direct combat role for the Russian contingent. This revised approach aims to minimize personnel exposure while maximizing operational impact.
This strategic evolution follows the Africa Corps’ assumption of duties from the infamous Wagner Group around mid-2024. The change occurred in the wake of significant losses sustained by Wagner, including an ambush by the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) near Tin Zaouatine, close to the Algerian border, which claimed the lives of several dozen Wagner fighters and Malian soldiers.
As a unit under the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Africa Corps maintains an estimated 2,000 personnel on the ground, many of whom are former Wagner mercenaries. This contingent represents a considerable reduction compared to the Wagner force and is roughly half the size of the French Operation Barkhane, the counter-terrorism force expelled by the Malian junta in 2022.
The loss of Kidal in northern Mali to the FLA and the Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans (GSIM) in late April appears to have been a decisive factor in the Africa Corps’ decision to consolidate its presence near its primary base in Bamako.
In response to the Kidal setback, the Africa Corps launched retaliatory airstrikes, causing extensive infrastructure damage and forcing residents to flee. These strikes were conducted in support of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which have increasingly become the primary ground force in the country’s northern regions.
We are witnessing a clear reliance on aerial assets. This recently included the deployment of Russian-made cluster munitions against communities in the Kidal region, a move that contravenes Mali’s commitments under international conventions prohibiting their use.
With fewer resources to disperse, the Africa Corps is evidently reluctant to scatter its forces across small northern communities where they could be vulnerable to elimination.
An analysis of recent Africa Corps communications on social media platforms indicates a shift in focus towards central and southern Mali, with the majority of their operations now concentrated closer to Bamako.
Following its departure from Kidal, the Africa Corps significantly escalated its propaganda efforts, publishing over 500 articles on Telegram and other channels in the weeks subsequent to the defeat.
Beyond airstrikes, the Africa Corps has also endeavored to circumvent economic blockades imposed by the GSIM in Mali. Its fighters and air support have begun escorting truck convoys entering the landlocked nation from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal, providing crucial protection against GSIM attacks.
Even as the Africa Corps seeks to reduce its direct combat exposure, the GSIM is employing drones to target Russian fighters at their bases. Recent videos circulating on social media, reportedly from the GSIM, depict drone footage showing Russian fighters being killed and Russian aircraft sustaining damage from bombs dropped on their Sévaré base.
In turn, the Africa Corps has launched its own armed drone strikes against GSIM positions in recent weeks, including an attack on a GSIM fuel depot in the Timbuktu region.
Mali has reportedly spent close to a billion dollars on the Wagner Group and then the Africa Corps since late 2021. During this period, the government and its Russian allies have lost control of the North, while the GSIM has expanded its reach across the Sahel. This expansion is, in part, attributed to the brutal tactics employed by both Russian forces and the FAMa against civilians in the North.
The current strategy adopted by the Malian state appears unsustainable, with the long-term stability of the nation at risk. Unfortunately, this approach seems to inadvertently strengthen the GSIM by alienating and pushing communities into its embrace.
