The JNIM says it took full control of several Burkinabè militia positions in Silmossin, near the town of Dédougou, on the evening of Friday, 25 September 2026. The claim lands in a context where the jihadist group keeps announcing operations against Burkinabè forces and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP).
A single day, three claimed positions
On the same day, the JNIM claimed it had seized two positions used by the Burkinabè army and the VDP in Aoréma and Klio, in the north of the country.
Beyond whether each claim is accurate, the sheer repetition of these announcements raises a central question: how effective is the security strategy pursued since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power?
A doctrine measured by what it can hold
For several years, the Burkinabè authorities have presented the reconquest of territory, the strengthening of national forces and the mobilisation of the VDP as the pillars of a new security doctrine. But a military strategy is not measured only by the number of soldiers deployed, operations announced or territories declared recaptured. Above all, it is measured by the state’s ability to hold its positions over time, secure populations, protect road corridors and prevent armed groups from returning to areas that were retaken.
It is precisely on that durability that the difficulties persist.
The heavy reliance on the VDP has widened the defence footprint, but it also exposes non-professional fighters at particularly vulnerable positions. Analyses of JNIM operations stress the weight of factors such as intelligence, mobility, logistics, surveillance of routes, coordination between units and, above all, the capacity to hold forward positions over time.
Retaking ground is not the same as holding it
The problem therefore runs deeper than a single battle won or lost. Retaking a position does not necessarily mean durably restoring state authority. A genuinely secure area should allow administrations to function, schools to reopen, markets to resume activity, farmers to return to their fields and displaced populations to come home.
It is on that ground that the security record of the Traoré regime deserves to be examined more rigorously.
Since taking power, Captain Ibrahim Traoré has made sovereignty, popular mobilisation and military reconquest central elements of his political message. Official communication regularly highlights the successes of national forces. But when armed groups continue to claim attacks on military positions or on the VDP, those announcements must be weighed against what can actually be observed on the ground.
On 25 September, Burkina Faso’s foreign minister himself acknowledged the need to learn lessons from what “has not worked so far” and stressed the importance of preventing the recruitment of young people by terrorist groups.
That statement matters: it shows that even on the official side, a purely military response is not enough.
An insurgency that adapts faster than the response
Burkina Faso is facing a particularly adaptable insurgency. The JNIM has developed mobility, intelligence, financing and the use of new technologies, while its operations keep pressuring security forces and civilian populations. ACLED notably points to evolving jihadist tactics, the growing use of drones and the difficulties Sahelian states face in durably preventing armed groups from re-entering certain areas.
For Ibrahim Traoré, the real challenge is therefore no longer simply to deliver a narrative of victory. It is to demonstrate, with figures and results, that the strategy launched in 2022 is actually reducing violence over the long term and restoring state authority.
Political communication can present advances. The ground imposes a different requirement: lasting security for populations.
What the fallout now demands
If the JNIM’s claims in Silmossin were to be confirmed, they would be a fresh signal of the vulnerability of forward positions. But even before any confirmation, the multiplication of claims against Burkinabè positions raises a legitimate question: why do some areas remain so difficult to secure despite more troops, more equipment and more resources devoted to counterterrorism?
That is where the real examination of Ibrahim Traoré’s security record lies.
The debate should therefore not be limited to slogans, images of military operations or declarations of victory. It must rest on verifiable indicators: territories durably secured, attacks on civilians, military losses, freedom of movement, the return of displaced people, the functioning of public services and the ability of national forces to hold retaken positions.
Without transparent data to measure these elements, the gap between the official narrative and information coming from the ground will keep fuelling questions.
And in a war against armed groups, it is not slogans that settle the debate: it is durable results on the ground.
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