In a late-September interview broadcast on BF1 TV, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s transitional president, rejected any prospect of normalising diplomatic relations with France, using unusually blunt language to criticise Paris’s posture. The remarks fit a pattern that has defined his administration since it took power in September 2022: a gradual break with the former French partner and a reorientation of Burkinabè diplomacy toward new allies, with Russia foremost among them.
Understanding the rupture: context behind a calculated realignment
Since seizing power, Traoré has repeatedly voiced hostility toward France, and ties between Ouagadougou and Paris have deteriorated sharply. The withdrawal of French forces, the departure of diplomats and the questioning of several forms of cooperation have marked this rupture. At the same time, the Burkinabè authorities have strengthened relations with Moscow and consolidated their alignment with Mali and Niger within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Presented by the authorities as a reconquest of national sovereignty, this diplomatic reorientation deserves scrutiny beyond political rhetoric. A sovereign state is free to choose its partners, but those choices must allow it to preserve decision-making autonomy, strengthen national capacities and durably improve living conditions for its population.
The central question is therefore this: has Burkina Faso genuinely freed itself from external influence, or has it simply replaced one historic partner with another whose interests do not necessarily align with its own?
Breaking with Paris does not, by itself, guarantee independence
Rejection of France has become a central element of Traoré’s political discourse. This stance resonates with part of the population, shaped by a long history of unbalanced relations with the former colonial power and by frustrations over the results of certain past cooperations.
However, denouncing French influence is not, in itself, a complete sovereignty policy. Breaking with one partner does not automatically mean becoming independent of all external influence. True sovereignty is also measured by a country’s ability to define its priorities, diversify its partnerships, negotiate balanced agreements and refuse pressure, whatever its origin.
Yet by presenting the break with Paris as major proof of national emancipation, the Burkinabè authorities risk reducing a complex issue to an opposition between two foreign powers. France becomes the symbol of past dependency, while Russia is presented as the solution to that dependency.
But this reading deserves nuance. No foreign partner — Western, Russian, Chinese or from any other region — bases its foreign policy exclusively on defending a third country’s interests. States first defend their own strategic, economic, military and diplomatic interests.
Russia is no exception to this rule.
Moscow as strategic ally, but not a disinterested partner
The rapprochement between Ouagadougou and Moscow is one of the most visible changes in Burkinabè foreign policy since Traoré came to power. Security cooperation occupies an important place in this new orientation, as Burkina Faso faces persistent insecurity linked to armed terrorist groups.
For the Burkinabè authorities, diversifying military partners can be a way to strengthen national capacities and move away from cooperation deemed insufficient with France. This choice falls within Burkina Faso’s sovereign right.
However, the question should not be whether Russia is preferable to France in principle, but rather what Burkina Faso concretely obtains from this new relationship.
What are each party’s commitments? What are the financial, military or economic counterparts? What is the duration of the agreements? What guarantees frame foreign partners’ interventions? And above all, to what extent does this cooperation contribute to durably strengthening the Burkinabè army’s own capacities?
These questions are essential. Military cooperation can provide operational support, equipment or technical expertise. But it does not automatically guarantee a durable improvement in the security situation. Its effectiveness must be assessed on verifiable results: protection of populations, securing of road axes, return of displaced persons and the ability of public services to function in areas affected by violence.
It would therefore be premature to consider the mere rapprochement with Moscow as proof of strategic success. Conversely, it would be equally excessive to conclude, without examining agreements and results, that Russia dictates all decisions of the Burkinabè authorities.
The real issue is to verify whether this partnership increases Burkina Faso’s decision-making capacity or creates new forms of dependency.
Changing partners does not necessarily mean changing the dependency system
One of the paradoxes of Traoré’s policy lies in how sovereignty is presented in public debate. The authorities claim to want to free Burkina Faso from Western influence, but this ambition cannot be assessed solely through declarations against France or rapprochements with Moscow.
Sovereignty is not limited to the choice of military partners. It also concerns control of natural resources, budgetary policy, economic independence, industrial capacity, food security and freedom to negotiate with foreign investors.
A country can break with a former partner power while remaining dependent on other actors for its military equipment, technologies, financing or certain commercial outlets. This dependency is not necessarily synonymous with submission, since international relations often rest on interdependencies. It becomes problematic, however, when alternative options are limited and the country struggles to defend its own priorities.
This is why Burkina Faso must be judged on its ability to genuinely diversify its relations, develop national skills and negotiate transparent partnerships.
If Russia becomes an indispensable partner in certain areas, without the country having credible alternatives, the risk would then be the emergence of a new dependency, even if it presents itself under a different political discourse.
The point is not to assert that Moscow controls Traoré’s decisions, for lack of evidence to support such a conclusion. Rather, it is to recall an obvious fact of international relations: a foreign partner, however politically close, pursues its own interests and cannot be considered disinterested by principle.
The AES: a sovereignty ambition that must also prove itself
The rapprochement between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, united within the Alliance of Sahel States, fits this desire to redefine regional power relations. The three countries highlight their sovereignty, their willingness to coordinate policies and their ambition to strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis external partners.
In principle, regional cooperation can be an important lever. It can facilitate pooling of defence resources, intelligence coordination, trade exchanges and the search for common solutions to Sahel challenges.
But a political alliance does not, by itself, guarantee the effectiveness of collective action. It must demonstrate its ability to produce concrete results for populations.
On the security front, persistent attacks, population displacements and difficulties encountered in certain localities require rigorous evaluation of the strategies adopted. The situation cannot be assessed solely through official declarations or discourse on territorial reconquest. It requires verifiable data, comparison over time and particular attention to the situation of civilians.
On the economic front, the ambition of regional integration must also translate into smoother trade, adapted infrastructure and mechanisms to support producers, traders and businesses.
Finally, the sovereignty claimed by the AES should also manifest itself through its members’ ability to maintain diversified relations with several partners, without turning their opposition to certain powers into an exclusive guiding principle of their diplomacy.
A sovereign alliance is not one that simply changes camps, but one that retains the freedom to choose, to negotiate and, if necessary, to say no to its own allies.
Political sovereignty cannot overshadow the results populations expect
Beyond diplomatic questions, the debate on sovereignty must be placed back in the daily lives of Burkinabè.
For populations facing insecurity, displacement, economic difficulties or limited access to certain public services, the essential question remains that of results.
The break with France may represent an assumed political choice. The rapprochement with Russia may also meet strategic objectives. But these decisions cannot exempt authorities from accounting for their effectiveness.
The security of persons, continuity of public services, access to healthcare and education, employment opportunities and protection of economic activities are all indicators for evaluating a government’s action.
It would therefore be insufficient to measure the success of Traoré’s policy by the number of declarations hostile to Paris, symbols of diplomatic rupture or multiplication of meetings with Russian officials.
Results must be examined on the ground, based on reliable and independent indicators.
Sovereignty cannot be solely a diplomatic posture. It must translate into an increased capacity of the state to protect its citizens, finance its priorities and meet the needs of its population.
The real test: Burkina Faso’s freedom of decision
By rejecting any normalisation with France, Traoré confirms his choice of a durable political break with Paris. But this orientation raises a fundamental question about the very conception of sovereignty defended by his regime.
A truly independent country must be able to choose its partners without submitting to their demands, maintain relations with several powers and defend its interests without being prisoner of its alliances.
France has its interests. Russia has its own. Other powers also pursue their own objectives. No diplomatic rapprochement should therefore be evaluated solely on the basis of ideological proximity between leaders.
Burkina Faso has the right to diversify its partnerships and redefine its strategic priorities. But it is up to its authorities to demonstrate that this reorientation produces measurable results and effectively strengthens the country’s autonomy.
The question is not to systematically defend Paris against Moscow, nor to consider Russia an adversary by principle. It is to know whether the choices made durably serve Burkina Faso’s interests.
Because, at bottom, sovereignty is not proclaimed solely in speeches against the former colonial power: it is verified in the ability to decide freely, to negotiate without constraint and to obtain concrete results for one’s people.
And it is precisely on this terrain that Traoré’s policy must be evaluated, beyond slogans, alliances and diplomatic declarations.
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