On the morning of 9 October 2026, the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fought a fierce battle near Tessit, close to the border with Burkina Faso. The two rivals issued conflicting claims of victory, each asserting that it had routed the other and seized new ground. These competing narratives do not settle the question of who actually prevailed, but they expose a deeper dynamic: armed groups continue to contest territory across the Sahel while civilians bear the cost of a conflict that shows no sign of abating.
What the Tessit clashes reveal about the limits of military strategy
The fighting near Tessit illustrates a contradiction at the heart of the security doctrine of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which are united under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, these juntas have staked their legitimacy on reclaiming sovereignty and defeating terrorism. Yet the persistence of armed groups their ability to move, organize and fight one another raises uncomfortable questions about the effectiveness of the strategies deployed so far.
The problem is not merely the existence of terrorist groups; it is the persistent inability of states to prevent them from establishing lasting footholds on their own soil. While JNIM and IS-S battle for positions, local populations continue to endure insecurity, displacement and economic disruption, despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES authorities frequently denounce foreign interference, accusing neighboring countries of facilitating armed group activity or providing rear bases. Such accusations require verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not by itself prove that its leaders support or harbor them voluntarily. Nonetheless, a fundamental question remains: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups operate freely in areas where the state struggles to assert lasting authority?
The gap between sovereignty rhetoric and ground realities
One of the central challenges for Sahelian military regimes is demonstrating that their strategic choices yield tangible results. The shift in military partners, the departure of Western forces and the rapprochement with Russia were presented as ways to regain control of the security situation. However, these changes alone do not eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across various Sahelian regions underscore that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, effective administration, civilian protection and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report published in 2026 described continued activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between these organizations over territorial control. This reality weakens narratives that attribute security failures exclusively to external machinations. Regional and cross-border factors do exist, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own results.
The political stakes of persistent insecurity
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how to prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent justification for concentrating power and postponing a return to constitutional order? It would be reckless to assert without evidence that AES leaders willingly harbor or nurture terrorist groups to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable proof.
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to scrutinize the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their governance. The distinction is crucial: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves orchestrate that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.
Citizens demand results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims of JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow for a definitive determination of which group won the 9 October clashes. But this uncertainty does not change the core issue: these organizations remain capable of conducting operations and contesting control of certain areas. For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity hampers movement, disrupts economic activity and complicates access to essential services.
Discourses about sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger thus face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing lasting presences and restore effective public authority in affected areas. Sovereignty is measured not only by the partners one chooses or the foreign forces one expels, but also by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer a fundamental question: beyond rhetoric and accusations directed outward, what durable results can they demonstrate to guarantee the security of their people?
By AMINATA KABORE — Journalist
Comments are closed, but trackbacks and pingbacks are open.