As Cameroon gears up for the 2027 elections, economist Serge Alain Godong dissects the country’s political landscape with unfiltered clarity.
By applying the game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, he argues that Maurice Kamto’s prospects for victory in 2018—and likely in the upcoming vote—were inherently slim. In a sharp analysis, he paints a regime that is openly in decline while voters cling to the security of the familiar over the uncertainty of change.
« The openly crumbling nature of Cameroon’s four-decade-old leadership is now more evident than ever, shaping the public’s divided loyalties between stability and transformation,» writes Serge Alain Godong, an economist trained at Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X. His assessment begins in 2018, when the shock of Kamto’s claim—that he had « scored the penalty »—faded into the backdrop of Paul Biya’s re-inauguration. The MRC was sidelined, and most Cameroonians « accepted the quiet continuation of power at Etoudi,» he notes.
Godong’s argument hinges on two foundational beliefs: humans are rational decision-makers, and they act on information. An election, in his view, is a national contract—a pledge on the future. Yet Kamto, he contends, cannot offer a contract more compelling than the one already in place. « The nearly 8.5 million Cameroonian voters heading to the polls will only back Maurice Kamto if they are certain he can safeguard their interests better than Paul Biya,» he asserts.
The economist identifies roughly 16 million « winners »—civil servants, private sector employees, professionals, and their families—who collectively share an annual income of 1.5 trillion FCFA. « This privileged group, benefiting from salaries, public contracts, and major infrastructure projects, will almost certainly cast their ballots for the RDPC and its candidate with full awareness,» he explains. This sets the stage for the prisoner’s dilemma: without coordinated signals or proof of a superior alternative, voters default to the status quo.
« Cameroonians recognize the current system is flawed, but many still prefer it to an uncertain equilibrium they cannot verify,» he writes. The analysis then shifts to what Godong terms the « Bamiléké problem, » referencing Meredith Terretta’s distinction between gung (territory) and lepue (freedom). This, he suggests, fuels an economic and social Darwinism among the Grassfields’ populations, where Kamto is not seen as a political alternative but as a « sinister figure embodying a nefarious plan.»
He labels this phenomenon a distinct societal « syndrome, » far removed from Stockholm Syndrome. Instead, he describes a culture of « eating together »—a system where « everyone takes from one another, » and success is measured by who « eats » while others go hungry. In this model, the winners are those who partake, and the losers are those left behind.
Godong concludes that whoever wins will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively: « Fast to redistribute. Strong to prioritize the economy as the sole engine of progress. » Growth targets of 6%, deficit reduction, and anti-corruption measures are not just goals—they are urgent necessities. Ultimately, he argues that Cameroon’s political game will grow « less complacent and less rent-seeking, » demanding a « strong and engaged Paul Biya » to navigate the post-era.
