When President Félix Tshisekedi announced a national dialogue for the Democratic Republic of Congo, the move raised a central question: can a consultative process deliver lasting peace without undermining the country’s constitutional order? A Paris-based lawyer who has examined the proposal argues that the answer depends on how strictly the dialogue’s boundaries are drawn. The real story is not the announcement itself but the legal architecture that will determine whether the initiative strengthens or weakens the State.
The legal framework behind the dialogue proposal
Me Ben Touere, a member of the Paris bar and a doctor of public law who teaches at Sorbonne Paris Nord University, contends that the national dialogue must function as a political mechanism for consultation and pacification—not as a parallel institution. In his view, the process can help build compromises on peace, national cohesion, institutional reforms and the functioning of the State. However, he warns that it must never turn into a second Parliament, a parallel Government, a political court or a de facto constituent assembly.
Why political conclusions need constitutional translation
According to the lawyer, any political conclusions reached during the dialogue would only produce durable legal effects after being translated by the institutions that are constitutionally competent to do so. He explains the sequence: a legislative reform must go through Parliament; a public policy falls to the Government; a question of constitutionality belongs to the Constitutional Court; and any matter reserved for the direct decision of the people must be submitted to them through the forms prescribed by law.
The proposed model, he adds, rests on a clear succession: dialogue, consensus, intervention by the competent institutions, constitutional review and—when required or legally warranted—a popular consultation.
The sovereignty principle that cannot be bypassed
Elenga points to Article 5 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle that national sovereignty belongs to the people. The people exercise it directly through elections or referendums, and indirectly through their representatives. From this, he draws a firm conclusion: neither the majority, nor the opposition, nor the participants in a dialogue can claim national sovereignty for themselves.
Reform the State, don’t fragment it
The ultimate aim, the analysis concludes, should be to reform and consolidate the State through dialogue—not to create mechanisms that could weaken it or share its prerogatives. In other words, the dialogue’s success will be measured by whether it reinforces the existing institutional order rather than erecting a competing one alongside it.
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