Over the past few weeks, initiatives have multiplied across West Africa to rebuild dialogue and consultation channels between ECOWAS member states and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). Central to these subtle efforts are security concerns and the need for common policies that harmonise actions, as far as possible, pending the sacred goal of pooling resources. To give this emergency diplomacy its best chance, involved actors must observe certain tacit requirements: sidestepping the dispute over the three AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS; overlooking resentments triggered by hostile communication campaigns from AES regimes against some regional states; and moving beyond the geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel that has fostered a cold-war climate between the AES and ECOWAS. In short, it means swallowing grudges, overcoming tensions and inappropriate displays of pride, to address the shared challenges of the moment.

Ivory Coast ‘ready to resume cooperation’

Among the strong signals of this turning point are recent statements by Ivorian Defence Minister Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he said he was ‘sincerely ready for a resumption of security cooperation’ with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that ‘terrorism, as it currently manifests, cannot be defeated by a single state. Collaboration and pooling of forces are necessary.’ This obvious truth bears repeating at a time when some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel ‘could become untenable in the medium term’ for the entire region.

What responses will Mali and Burkina Faso give to this call from Ivory Coast? Nothing yet suggests a collective surge of lucidity from all concerned parties to work together on solutions to the urgent issues raised. Even if the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso acknowledge that the break with ECOWAS ‘does not exclude bilateral cooperation,’ it is difficult for them to suddenly change their stance toward the Ivorian interlocutor. Ivory Coast is regularly accused of harbouring terrorists ‘financed’ or ‘sponsored’ by French imperialism, making it a prime target in the AES’s fabrication of external — even imaginary — enemies. Although these accusations have never been backed by facts or any evidence, they feed the doctrinaire narrative of regimes born from coups that led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Yet despite these strained diplomatic relations, Ivory Coast maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status by the thousands on Ivorian soil.

‘New era’ for Bénin and Niger

Also targeted by those same accusations, Bénin — whose new president, Romuald Wadagni, shortly after his inauguration on 24 May, made conciliatory gestures toward AES countries — has a special mention for Niger. Their common border has been closed since the aftermath of the July 2023 coup in Niamey. With all dialogue between the two countries seemingly impossible, the arrival of a new leader in Bénin provided an opportunity to end what had become a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Béninese president Patrice Talon.

The change at the helm of Bénin has thus acted as an accelerator of ‘reconciliation’ between these two neighbours. In this spirit, a meeting of Nigerien and Béninese experts took place in Cotonou on 20–21 June to draft terms for a new cooperation, mainly focusing on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the common border — a decisive factor for reviving economic activities between Bénin and Niger. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation stressed its wish for more information about the alleged presence of ‘foreign elements’ at the Bénin-Niger border. This request echoes the stubborn suspicion of the Niamey military regime that Bénin hosts a ‘French military base’ intended to ‘destabilise Niger’ or ‘finance terrorism’. An accusation that defies common sense: why would Bénin finance terrorism when it is itself a target and victim? Such statements have become routine narrative from AES regimes struggling to contain the continuous deterioration of the security situation on their territories. Their promise to unite military means against terrorism has not moved beyond speeches. Today, vast areas of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by terrorist armed groups, whose expansion and formidable project the ruling juntas cannot contain.

The hour has come for reconciliation between Niger and Bénin. According to Nigerien Minister of Interior and Security Mohamed Toumba, ‘a new era is opening’ for the two countries. He stated, ‘By choosing dialogue over confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.’ Nigerien and Béninese actors are well aware that beyond security lies the equally crucial economic stake in a region where populations share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to realist and pragmatic diplomacy, what is unfolding between Bénin and Niger resembles a textbook case or a pilot event for a re-evaluated, intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities in the common West African space.

Endogenous responses to the security crisis

Initiatives aimed at normalising relations between ECOWAS and AES countries should become even clearer in the coming months. Besides reactivating neighbourhood dynamics that have prevailed for decades in this region, they highlight the urgency of endogenous responses to the security equation. This echoes the recommendations made last year by UN Secretary-General António Guterres for ‘a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries.’ In December 2025, Russia — a privileged partner of AES countries — sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for ‘the pursuit of pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES, to find common solutions to counter shared challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism.’ These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation — a way of reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.

Bilateral relational protocols are already observed between the AES and certain countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo, and Sénégal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahel’s military regimes have maintained their presence within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from the principle of free movement within the ECOWAS space. Ultimately, one must question the justification for the AES promoters’ exit from the regional community. The only available answer refers back to the initial dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that occurred in AES countries, and especially the refusal of the AES leaders to work toward ‘restoration of constitutional order.’ In many respects, the rift between the AES and ECOWAS resembles an artificial or incomplete divorce.