The move signals a mutual desire to craft a text rooted in enduring strategic interests. Both nations share the ambition to create, with necessary adjustments, a counterpart to the Élysée Treaty signed in 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer between France and Germany.
This joint commission is not tasked with negotiating the treaty itself—that responsibility lies with the two governments—but rather with formulating proposals. These include guiding principles for the partnership, strategic priorities for the 2035–2040 horizon, mechanisms for political dialogue, and avenues for cooperation in economic, security, military, academic, and cultural fields.
Nonetheless, a fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? It will replace the so-called La Celle-Saint-Cloud accord, signed in France on November 6, 1955, which served as the foundation for Morocco’s return to independence and the end of the protectorate, officially formalized on March 2, 1956. It was on the basis of this accord that Paris authorized the return to the throne of Mohammed V, who had been deported on August 20, 1953.
Today, the aim is undoubtedly to consolidate the achievements of a privileged—indeed exceptional—cooperation while laying the strategic groundwork for an equal relationship, one designed to last for decades to come.
Four main pillars stand out. The first concerns the economy: Paris commits to making significant investments in Morocco’s automotive, railway, defense, and maritime transport sectors, and to supporting their modernization through the most advanced technologies. In return, Rabat pledges to grant French companies preferential access to major infrastructure projects and to offer tax incentives.
This treaty would link France to a non-European Union state, a feat Algeria has never managed to finalize despite more than two decades of attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, followed by those of Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
The second pillar focuses on security and defense industry cooperation: transfers of military technology intended, over time, to make Morocco a regional production hub for light and heavy equipment (aviation, munitions, military vehicles, armored systems, and more), expansion of joint training and exercise programs, and strengthened coordination on security and intelligence to address regional challenges, particularly in the Sahel.
The cultural domain constitutes the third pillar, and a significant one at that: maintaining the privileged position of the French language in the education system, promoting Francophonie without hindering the kingdom’s openness to English as an international business language, facilitating access for Moroccan students—currently over 42,000—to French universities, expanding the existing network of twelve French cultural institutes, and opening new schools, especially in the southern provinces.
The final pillar falls under geopolitics and strategy. It concerns Paris’s support for Morocco’s higher interests: backing the autonomy plan for the Sahara, validated by the United Nations Security Council within the framework of the negotiated settlement process (Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025), support within European Union institutions, and defense of Morocco’s interests in areas such as agriculture and fisheries, as well as in various bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.
Furthermore, France hopes to count on Morocco to participate, in various forms, in new strategic alliances in West Africa, where its influence has gradually waned over the past decade. The goal is to leverage the kingdom’s position as a regional hub.
Ultimately, this treaty carries major symbolic and diplomatic weight. It would bind France to a non-EU state, while Algeria has never succeeded in finalizing a similar accord despite repeated attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and later Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Morocco is now asserting itself as a regional power, an economic hub, and a key player on energy, logistics, and security issues. This treaty could thus take on a demonstrative and exemplary dimension: that of a model capable of rearticulating new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.
