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Mali rebel offensive: could it lead to comprehensive political negotiations?
In Mali, the military junta led by Assimi Goïta—closely aligned with Russia—has been severely weakened by a massive insurgent offensive launched on April 25 by jihadists from the JNIM (affiliated with Al-Qaïda) and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Northern Mali now risks falling into rebel hands, mirroring the 2012 crisis when French forces intervened. Yet the contexts differ: Western military intervention appears unlikely this time. What are the rebels’ objectives? How might Russia respond? And how should European nations prepare for the emergence of a new jihadist proto-state in Mali? This analysis examines the risks for civilians and the growing fragmentation across the Sahel.
On April 25, 2026, a coordinated military assault rocked Mali as the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—the Al-Qaïda-affiliated Sahelian branch—and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched a sweeping offensive against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners in the Afrika Korps. The attack has plunged the country into a new cycle of violence, reviving fears of a northern takeover reminiscent of March 2012, though under vastly different political circumstances.
How does 2026 differ from 2012? What short-term outcomes might this offensive yield?
Current context: the largest offensive in years
On April 25, 2026, rebel forces targeted five key Malian cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since March 2012 that jihadists and separatists have launched a joint operation of such scale, shifting from sporadic coordination since 2024 to a concrete partnership. Across all cities, attacks focused on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites such as the Kati military district and the airport were hit.
A partial assessment of the operation is possible, though the situation remains fluid:
- Northern towns have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal and surrounding areas like Tessalit and Anéfis are now under coalition rule, along with Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit. These gains encircle Tombouctou and Gao, though key military bases in the north—including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok—remain contested.
- Junta leaders have come under direct fire. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, while Security State Agency chief General Modibo Koné was among those wounded. President Assimi Goïta, the junta’s figurehead, was reportedly evacuated to the Turkish embassy before resurfacing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
- Rumors of a potential junta power struggle involving General Malick Diaw circulated but were never confirmed. One thing is certain: the military leadership has been severely shaken by the attack.
While this offensive echoes 2012, key differences stand out:
- JNIM and FLA have coordinated openly, with JNIM allowing FLA leaders to take a public role. Unlike FLA figures such as Elghabass Ag Intallah and Bilal Ag Cherif, JNIM leaders—including Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa—have remained out of sight, with only high-ranking JNIM cadre Sidan Ag Hitta spotted in Tessalit.
- Rather than executing captured soldiers as in 2012, both groups prioritize negotiation and disarmament, offering FAMa fighters safe passage before calling on others to lay down arms. They position themselves as protectors of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
- Negotiations with Russian mercenaries secured their orderly withdrawal from bases in Kidal and other northern towns, mirroring tactics used in Syria—likely facilitated by Algeria in coordination with the FLA.
- The northern conquest was enabled by a strategy to pin FAMa forces in the center and Bamako simultaneously. The prolonged assault on Bamako itself is unprecedented.
Negotiations with Russian mercenaries allowed them to withdraw from northern bases without resistance, a move mirroring tactics observed in Syria.
This offensive underscores how both armed groups have moderated their approaches, learning from past failures and successes since 2012. Instead of focusing on visible territorial control, they appear to be advancing a strategy of strangling cities and the junta—evident since 2020. By April 28, JNIM had imposed a full blockade on Bamako, burning transport trucks to signal resolve while the junta organizes intermittent supply convoys to keep the capital operational.
Unlike in 2012–2013, the regime, FAMa, and their Russian allies have not collapsed entirely, instead attempting to regain momentum through sweeping counterinsurgency operations. While the situation is dire for Bamako, it is not yet terminal. In response, civil society voices have renewed calls for negotiations with armed groups, criticizing the junta’s exclusive reliance on military force. Prominent figures such as politician Oumar Mariko, former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, imam Mahmoud Dicko, and the Sahel Democrats’ Alliance (based in Brussels) have echoed these demands.
Amid this shifting landscape, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) launched an attack on Ménaka but was repelled by Malian-Russian forces. Though not part of the JNIM/FLA offensive, EIWS remains a persistent and serious threat in northeastern Mali.
An anticipated crisis
In a September 15, 2022 analysis, we warned that Russian military support was an illusion incapable of addressing Mali’s security challenges. Designed to prop up the junta and advance Russia’s Sahel Alliance (AES), Moscow’s strategy has proven counterproductive—alienating civilians and failing to curb JNIM’s expansion.
- In January 2023, a forward-looking exercise outlined scenarios that are now unfolding:
- “Rising tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner forces will reignite armed clashes in the north, with the CMA objectively allied to JNIM, aiding its bid to reclaim full control over northern Niger’s loop and potentially half of Mali.“
- “The central region’s fragmentation will fuel regular clashes between the Macina Katibat and community defense militias. These militias are unlikely to prevail, gradually ceding the center to JNIM.“
- “The Malian capital will be encircled in its outskirts […]. Without a total military collapse, occupying Bamako as in 2012 is unlikely.“
- “The loss of Mali’s control will trigger political tensions and, ultimately, negotiations with JNIM to establish a durable truce. This could result in significant territorial concessions or constitutional changes, with religious institutions pressuring political leaders to negotiate.“
By November 2023, after FAMa and Russian forces recaptured Kidal, we noted that this victory was illusory. The CMA had strategically retreated to regroup for a future counteroffensive, a trend that culminated in recent gains. These developments confirm that the current crisis was foreseeable. With this foundation, we can explore probable future trajectories.
Short-term outlook
Militarily, the JNIM/FLA coalition will likely negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north before targeting Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali—much like in March 2012. At that time, the offensive unfolded in stages: Kidal fell first, followed by separate advances on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions among Malian troops accelerating the collapse. Under current pressure—both military and through negotiations—FAMa’s disintegration risks continuing, given the breakdown in command chains and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from northern strongholds, Gao, Tombouctou, and the entire Niger River loop will likely fall.
The only factor that could delay a rapid conquest is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabe TB2 drones. While JNIM/FLA could target Malian drones, Burkinabe and Nigerien drones are harder to neutralize.
The north of Mali is poised to fall under FLA and JNIM control, especially as both groups have tempered their objectives: the FLA seeks de facto autonomy without political independence, while JNIM appears content with a less stringent application of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a 2012-style scenario where jihadists violently seized cities and imposed strict governance. Recall that AQMI’s failure against French forces in 2013 led its leaders to advocate for a softer expansion strategy—one rooted in proselytization and limited Islamic law enforcement.
The northern takeover will position armed groups advantageously, but with two additional fronts that will strain resources: confronting the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and countering aerial incursions by Malian and Burkinabe forces.
Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are active in central Mali, and the northern offensive may be accompanied by new attacks on Malian garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. Without FLA support in this region, operations may focus on breaking FAMa formations rather than seizing urban centers. Recent retaliatory attacks by jihadists on civilians in villages like Kori-Kori and Gomossogou reflect this strategy. However, this violence risks clashing with the broader political image JNIM seeks to project as a counter to junta brutality. The difficulty in controlling all factions within JNIM remains a known vulnerability among its leaders.
The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons: first, JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, frequently besieging cities and negotiating local agreements that allow limited Islamic law enforcement. This approach mirrors historical models like the Viet Minh in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Second, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks the troop numbers to sustain broad territorial control.
The 2012–2013 takeover of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled jihadist groups to recruit heavily, particularly in central communities. If this strategy repeats, JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.
The siege of Bamako is a strategy to suffocate the junta, paving the way for regime change or forced negotiations.
The siege of Bamako is a deliberate strategy to strangle the junta, either forcing its collapse or compelling negotiations. Despite official propaganda, the scale of the April offensive—following a months-long blockade—exposes the junta’s inability to manage the crisis. Assimi Goïta, like Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, is trapped in Bamako. Growing distrust between junta leaders, particularly Goïta’s increasing skepticism of Russia, threatens the partnership’s stability. With key proponents of the Russian alliance—such as Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné—temporarily or permanently sidelined, revisiting this arrangement becomes feasible. The Russian partnership may unravel, accelerating the conquest of the north and center. Ongoing negotiations and months of tension between FAMa and Russian mercenaries—who have criticized the national army since the Tinzawatene defeat—further undermine the alliance.
Yet, unless negotiations become inevitable, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive. Continuing payments could secure Russian protection in Bamako, but territorial recovery appears improbable. If Russia disengages, Mali will rely on limited support from Burkina Faso and Niger, themselves embroiled in conflicts with jihadists. Senegal may mobilize at its border but is unlikely to deploy troops into Mali, given JNIM’s growing presence there. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.
Looking ahead:
- The long-term dynamics since 2022 indicate northern Mali’s fall is inevitable, as is the loss of control in the center. While the timeline remains unclear, the balance of power is decisive.
- The medium-term outlook shows the Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy—a reality underscored by recent events.
- Two potential turning points could emerge:
- Negotiations commence, either due to junta collapse or external diplomatic pressure.
- A foreign military intervention reverses the tide, though this remains unlikely given current global priorities.
What’s next for Mali and the international community?
In this context, several scenarios—some overlapping—are likely unfolding.
Scenario 1: Prospects for foreign military intervention
What if JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such a move would have triggered a Western military intervention.
This scenario raises a critical question: how should the international community respond when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such an act would have prompted Western military intervention to dismantle the jihadist movement. Withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Sahel since then have made such operations politically untenable. Is regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic? Regionally, only Algeria’s army could reverse the balance of power—but Algeria is unlikely to intervene outside its borders given its historical doctrine of non-intervention. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and JNIM since 2010. Other regional armies have struggled against jihadists, limiting their willingness to expand operations. Thus, only an international intervention could tip the scales, temporarily, as Operation Barkhane once did. However, France and the UN are unlikely to return to the Sahel, and European nations will not act alone. The U.S. is focused elsewhere. These realities make negotiations the most plausible path forward.
Scenario 2: Prospects for comprehensive political negotiations
Since 2025, JNIM leaders have pursued a strategy akin to Syria’s HTC, seeking to nationalize their struggle and implement a ‘moderate’ Islamic governance model while engaging in dialogue with the international community. To achieve this, JNIM has sought a sponsor—potentially Algeria or Mauritania—since 2024, mirroring Turkey’s role in Syria. Both countries maintain close ties with FLA leaders and JNIM cadres, oppose Bamako’s junta, and could facilitate negotiations, though neither has confirmed a willingness to play this role.
This strategy anticipates a collapse of the junta followed by negotiations with a political force amenable to their demands: application of Islamic law nationwide, greater autonomy for the north and center, and integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.
A key challenge remains: unlike the HTC or Taliban, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaïda, nor abandoned its ambition to export its ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Moreover, JNIM has not engaged in official dialogue with the international community, complicating its normalization. It remains unclear whether JNIM can be an acceptable negotiating partner under current conditions. Without pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (such as Togo or Ghana) against the junta, the path to negotiations is fraught with obstacles.
Without negotiations, the strangulation strategy will persist, and captured cities will serve as launchpads for further attacks on FAMa. A Bamako blockade could spark civil society resistance or a coup, though systematic repression since 2020 suggests the junta remains stable. Until talks begin, the noose around Bamako tightens, and rebel advances continue.
The rise of a jihadist proto-state demands vigilance, akin to monitoring in Syria and Afghanistan for potential terrorist threats.
Long-term, France and Europe must recognize that the strategic landscape has shifted. Despite their relative normalization, the emergence of a jihadist proto-state in Mali will require heightened surveillance, as seen in Syria and Afghanistan, to preempt potential cross-border terrorist threats. Arab and African partners must be mobilized and supported to contain and normalize these actors on the global stage.
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