When a leader who seized power through a coup begins to fear being toppled himself, the consequences ripple far beyond the presidential palace. In Niger, the fallout from the 29 August coup attempt has sparked a far-reaching purge that is reshaping the country’s political landscape and raising uncomfortable questions about the future of General Abdourahamane Tiani’s regime.
A decree that sent shockwaves through the nation
The decree signed on 17 September stripping five Nigeriens of their nationality including former Prime Minister Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou landed in an already charged atmosphere. It marked a dramatic escalation in a crackdown that has been unfolding since the failed putsch, and it has ignited a fierce public debate about citizenship, loyalty, and the limits of state power.
The timing tells its own story. On 26 July 2023, General Tiani came to power by overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum. Three years later, on 29 August 2026, the man who took power by force found himself facing a similar attempt to remove him. This time, the threat came not from outside but from within the ranks of his own military.
The presidential palace was targeted. Air Base 101 was attacked. The state television headquarters was stormed. For hours, the balance of power within the military apparatus hung in the balance, with some officers reportedly hesitating to take sides as mutineers tried to rally support.
For a man who rose to power through a coup, the message was unmistakable: the very scenario he had helped set in motion could now be turned against him.
The aftermath: a regime under siege
The coup attempt did not succeed in removing Tiani, but it fundamentally altered the dynamics of power. Reports indicate that the junta relied on several hundred Russian Africa Corps personnel to retake Air Base 101. At least 200 military personnel have been arrested since 29 August, most of them from the special forces.
Then the chain of command began to shift. On 11 September, the chief of defense staff, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, was dismissed. Days later, four ministers were replaced. The official line speaks of reorganization and securing the command structure but in politics, timing is everything, and the timing here suggests a leadership circling its wagons around those it trusts most.
Citizenship revoked: a controversial tool
The 17 September decree was a thunderbolt. It provisionally stripped five people of their Nigerien nationality, including Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou, who served as prime minister under Bazoum. The decree cites “intelligence with foreign powers,” dissemination of data liable to disturb public order, alleged participation in demoralizing the army and the nation, and threats to state security.
It is crucial to note that these are accusations and prosecutions mentioned in the decree, not a final judicial conviction. Yet politically, the symbolism is heavy. Mahamadou is not just any opponent he belongs to the old state apparatus, having served under the very president Tiani overthrew. With this latest decree, five more Nigeriens have been provisionally deprived of their nationality under a mechanism introduced in 2024, bringing the total to 25, according to the Nigerien Press Agency.
This raises a troubling question: at what point does the defense of the state cease to be a security operation and become a political cleansing? The question must be asked without presuming the guilt or innocence of those targeted.
The ghost of Bazoum and the politics of suspicion
Three years after the coup, former President Mohamed Bazoum remains a central figure in Niger’s political confrontation. His regime is gone, his institutions dismantled, but the men who served him continue to surface in the new government’s security and judicial files.
Since 29 August, the Nigerien authorities have had to confront a threat that no longer comes solely from armed groups or external adversaries. The threat can now, according to reported events, emerge from within the military apparatus itself. When the loyalty of soldiers becomes a central concern, the temptation to hunt for those responsible, for relays, accomplices, or sponsors, can become overwhelming.
The risk is that suspicion becomes a method of governance: a military officer replaced, a minister sidelined, soldiers arrested, former officials of the Bazoum regime targeted, and now citizens provisionally stripped of their nationality. Taken individually, each act has its official justification. Taken together, they paint a picture of a power that, after being directly threatened, seeks to regain control over every circle that could represent a vulnerability.
A president who trusts no one
Perhaps the most uncomfortable question for the regime is this: how do you govern sustainably when a power born of a coup discovers that another coup can be applied to it? General Tiani now knows this mechanism from the inside. He knows that a military power can seem firmly installed until the day a few officers decide to cross a line. The events of 29 August proved that what was supposed to be impossible became possible what was unthinkable unfolded around the presidential palace.
When a power discovers it can be overthrown by the same methods that brought it to the top, the fear of the next plot can quickly become a political obsession. This is where critics of the regime see a worrying drift. By deciding who is loyal, who is suspect, who must be arrested, who must be sidelined, and now who can provisionally keep their nationality, Tiani gives his detractors the impression of a leader acting as if he alone holds the keys to the Republic.
As if Niger must be divided between those who support the regime and those who must be excluded. As if having served under Bazoum now constitutes a permanent political fault. As if every dissenting voice must necessarily hide a plot. General Tiani is obviously not Niger, but the concentration of decisions around his person fuels a fundamental question: how far can a regime go when, to protect itself, it ends up seeing threats behind every face?
The paradox of power born from a putsch
The irony of this story is inescapable. Tiani rose to the top after a coup. Today he leads a regime that has itself just escaped a coup attempt. Between these two dates, Niger seems to have tipped into a cycle where each crisis produces new purges, each suspicion calls for a new sanction, and each attempt at contestation reinforces the concentration of power.
The 17 September decree is therefore not merely a matter of nationality. It is a new episode in a broader battle: that of a power seeking to eliminate zones of uncertainty around itself. One question remains, perhaps the most important: by fighting real or supposed plots, is Tiani building a system where any contestation automatically becomes a plot?
If so, the problem is no longer just who wants to overthrow Tiani. It is also why a power that claims to be firmly installed now seems so afraid of those around it. And above all, how far will this logic go? For when a regime starts treating its own citizens as potential threats, the line between protecting the state and protecting the regime becomes dangerously thin and the fallout is already being felt across Niger.
By Aïssata Issa — Analyst
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