France’s evolving stance on the critical crisis gripping Mali is becoming increasingly clear. Bruno Fuchs, a centrist (Modem) and President of the French National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, who frequently accompanies President Emmanuel Macron on his travels, openly shared his perspectives on the situation.
Beyond optimistic assertions regarding France’s future influence on the African continent – suggesting that eliminating ‘irritants’ such as the CFA franc and visa issues would restore France as a desired power – the most striking aspect of his recent statements lies in an inherent contradiction. This contradiction exists between promises to abandon the old colonial ‘Françafrique’ relationship and a persistent preoccupation with reclaiming influence lost to Russia.
Most notably, his remarks concerning Mali struck a cynical and somewhat irritating tone. Bruno Fuchs, echoing what appears to be a sentiment among various French military and political strategists who reportedly welcomed the complex attack on April 25, presented a narrative: “The Russians are currently negotiating their departure from Mali, and the ruling junta in Bamako is set to fall within weeks or months.”
Recalling President Macron’s recent statement in Nairobi – “the departure of French military personnel was undoubtedly not the best decision the putschists made for their country” – the interviewer asked if France was pleased with Russia’s military failures in northern Mali.
“Removing the French partner was counterproductive”
Bruno Fuchs sidestepped the direct question, instead paraphrasing the President: “Removing the French partner was counterproductive.” The implication for listeners was clear. The deputy then continued his scenario: “I believe the Malian junta has only days or weeks left. Currently, it is in a weak position relative to the FLA and the JNIM. Therefore, the regime in Mali will change within weeks or months; it’s inevitable.”
The parliamentarian then ventured into particularly sensitive territory. He posited that “Malians have a choice between integral jihadists [editor’s note: a curious concept] – though not for all [even more fascinating] (…) and FLA rebels on one side, and democratic life, public liberties, and Mali’s former way of life on the other.” He insisted, “Life in Mali is likely to change,” seemingly oblivious to the fourteen years of conflict already endured by the beleaguered population.
“How to integrate the JNIM?“
With unwavering confidence, Bruno Fuchs proceeded to outline Mali’s political future. He presented two possible scenarios. In the first, Bamako agrees to negotiate. “If the junta and President Assimi Goïta are reasonable, they will open negotiations. There would be a transition period of three to six months with one of the military figures from the Transition – I won’t name names, but it wouldn’t be Assimi Goïta – leading to elections within three or six months.” We can overlook the unrealistic timeline. Such a transition, initiated under JNIM pressure, would, in his view, raise a central question: “The question arises: in governance, in common work, how do we integrate the JNIM?” This formulation deserves scrutiny: the JNIM is affiliated with al-Qaeda, and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was France’s public enemy number one, with France losing 57 soldiers in the fight against this group in the Sahel.
On the JNIM, Bruno Fuchs appeared to possess firsthand information, perhaps even more than any Malian. Attention, a scoop!
“I believe the JNIM is ready to lay down its arms and cease armed struggle, provided it participates in the country’s political life. Not to take control of Mali, but to participate in political life.” The President of the Foreign Affairs Committee did not explain why the most powerful actor on the ground would merely participate without asserting its dominance. Perhaps because, as everyone knows, the important thing is not to win but to participate. This presents a cruel dilemma: “The question that will arise for us, Europeans or French, is what do we do? Do we support this transition in which the JNIM has a political role, or do we not? I don’t have the answer, but it’s a real problem of conscience and a real political problem.” Indeed, it is a serious question. Not just “for us, Europeans or French,” but primarily for Malians.
“The worst: Afghanistan”
- Bruno Fuchs pulled a second scenario from his pocket. “The junta absolutely wants to resist, does not negotiate, and at some point, finds itself in a position of weakness. The Russians are negotiating their departure, contrary to what they say (…) At that point, the junta will fall. If it’s not negotiated, it will certainly be worse than if there had been a negotiation.” Worse for whom? For Mali, for the region, for France? Fuchs did not specify. Returning to his first scenario, the deputy elaborated on what the anticipated negotiations might produce.
“We could have a Mauritanian-style model, meaning a religious regime; a Nigerian model, meaning a federal state in Mali where some states or one state applies Sharia (…) and others do not. So, ultimately, a federal state with different regimes, guaranteeing the representativeness and role of each community in the country’s life, the political life of the country, as in Nigeria for example.” This is Bruno Fuchs’s favored scenario: a not-too-extremist Islamic Republic where each community sees its representativeness and role guaranteed. How? He did not say. A pity, as it would have advanced the debate. The concern, in Mali, is that communities share the same space. They do not yet live in bantustans. All of this, therefore, remains quite vague, even nebulous.
The second scenario is the “ultimate scheme”: Afghanistan. While Bruno Fuchs seemed comfortable with the first, he stated he “does not wish for an Afghanistan in the heart of the Sahel, because afterwards, that will have consequences for the entire zone,” including the Sahelian countries, of course, but also their “innocent” neighbors: Guinea, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo. “Complicated.” One could not put it better.
“The Russians would be ready to withdraw”
Somewhat taken aback by these peremptory revelations, the interviewer pressed further. “Do you have information indicating that the Russians are preparing to leave Bamako?”
Indeed, Bruno Fuchs replied, without hesitation. “They are negotiating. They have repositioned their forces. Negotiations are currently underway.” Regarding the uncertain outcome of these discussions, “everything depends on the JNIM, everything depends on the junta.” But, he was certain, the Russians “would be ready to withdraw, provided certain guarantees are made regarding the assets they currently exploit in Mali, such as the gold mines, which they are reluctant to see confiscated, even if their legitimacy to exploit them is, in my opinion, quite questionable.”
Bruno Fuchs, despite expressing a desire to close the regrettable chapter of ‘Françafrique’ with its “colonial-era behavior,” this unresolved “history with Francophone Africa,” this tendency to impose “our truths and our views” and to be unable to tolerate “resistance,” still held strong opinions on who legitimately should exploit Mali’s resources.
The subtext suggests that France, and arguably Europe, “not to be immodest,” holds greater legitimacy than Russia. And why? Because France “is reliable in its commitments,” unlike the Americans and Russians “who are leaving Mali because things are not going well for them.” Without missing a beat, he then cited the example of the Central African Republic, with which “we have normalized our relations, we have re-established normal relations with President Faustin Archange Touadéra” even though “the Russians are there.” “We must learn to work with everyone.”
With everyone. Except the despised leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States.
