In Mali, the blockade enforced by the Jamaat Nusrat ul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group, has intensified significantly over the weekend. At least ten buses were set ablaze along the Ségou–Bamako corridor, a vital supply route into the capital from eastern regions. Simultaneously, electrical infrastructure linked to the Manantali hydroelectric dam in the Kayes region was deliberately targeted and destroyed. While Malian armed forces continue counteroffensives across multiple fronts, they have yet to break the economic stranglehold choking the country.
Manantali: the dam at the heart of a grinding war
The assault on Manantali’s transmission lines is far from incidental. Operated under a trilateral agreement between Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal through the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), the dam forms the backbone of Mali’s urban power supply. By disabling its export lines, JNIM is no longer engaging only military targets—it is striking the nerve center of the economy, where electricity outages paralyze public services, businesses, and industrial output almost instantly.
This campaign follows weeks of systematic disruption, including repeated ambushes on fuel convoys arriving from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. The jihadists aim to weaponize fuel shortages, betting on eroding public confidence in the transitional government led by General Assimi Goïta. Bamako, long spared the worst of the conflict, now finds itself at the epicenter of a war of attrition.
Army’s countermeasures and fragile supply relief
The Malian military reports ongoing ground and aerial operations across several regions. In recent days, armed escorts have escorted hundreds of tanker trucks into Bamako, temporarily easing pressure on gas stations under siege. Yet this logistical lifeline remains fragile: each convoy demands substantial resources, and securing national highways over the long term appears increasingly unattainable.
The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) are also caught in a pincer movement. In the west and central zones, JNIM has escalated ambushes and infrastructure sabotage. Meanwhile, tensions remain frozen in the north, particularly around Kidal, where renewed clashes with rebel factions from the Permanent Strategic Framework seem imminent. Bamako is now managing two distinct fronts with dwindling manpower and matériel.
Regional spillover and shared stakes
The blockade’s ripple effects extend far beyond Mali’s borders. Neighboring economies—especially those of Senegal, Mauritania, and Côte d’Ivoire—are grappling with the fallout of disrupted West African trade corridors. Slowdowns in goods movement are straining ports in Dakar and Abidjan, a significant portion of whose inland traffic normally feeds the Sahel hinterland. The Confédération des États du Sahel—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—has yet to forge a unified response to the jihadists’ economic warfare.
The Manantali attack also raises urgent questions about shared facilities under the OMVS umbrella. Further damage could directly jeopardize power supplies to Senegal and Mauritania, transforming a Malian crisis into a regional emergency. External partners, whether development donors or military suppliers, now face a delicate balancing act: upholding Bamako’s sovereignty claims while protecting cross-border critical infrastructure.
On the ground, the gap between the army’s operational claims and the lived reality of a besieged capital underscores the conflict’s unprecedented phase. JNIM’s strategy has evolved—it is no longer just controlling territory; it is seeking to suffocate a state. Fresh fighting is expected in the coming days, particularly around Kidal.
