Exactly five years ago, on this Sunday, May 24, 2026, General Assimi Goïta orchestrated a military takeover in Mali. Since then, the nation has witnessed a concerning decline in the well-being of its citizens, marked by diminishing security, restricted freedom of expression, and a shrinking space for press freedom. This challenging period forms a critical chapter in contemporary Africa politics.

To gain deeper insight into these developments, I recently spoke with Ulf Laessing, who serves as the Sahel program director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

Insights from Ulf Laessing

Ulf Laessing highlighted the escalating repression within the country. “The crackdown has intensified. It’s no longer easy to express oneself freely,” he observed. “While frank discussions are still possible with trusted acquaintances, people have undoubtedly become more cautious. This represents a clear criticism of the government. Furthermore, critical voices have faced imprisonment, and many others have been forced into exile.”

DW: What tangible improvements have the Malian people experienced since the military assumed control?

Ulf Laessing: Initially, there were some localized improvements in security. For instance, the road to Ségou remained open for an extended period, allowing some farmers to return to their fields. However, this progress proved temporary. The crisis has persisted, exacerbated by rapid demographic growth, climate change, and pervasive insecurity. I remain very pessimistic about any government’s ability to significantly alter the current trajectory.

DW: In 2020, the military took power with a stated ambition to eradicate jihadist threats. This objective appears far from being achieved.

Ulf Laessing: Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State effectively control certain regions of the country. I believe it’s unlikely that any government, whether through another coup or a future elected administration, will manage to fully reclaim these areas. I am quite pessimistic regarding the prospects for achieving lasting peace in Mali.

DW: In late April, a series of coordinated assaults were carried out by jihadists and Touareg rebels.

Ulf Laessing: Yes, that was a profound shock. It marked the most significant attack since 2012, when Touareg rebels and jihadists briefly seized control of the north before French forces intervened a year later. This was a direct assault on the state itself. While the government has managed to retain power, losing parts of the north, the rebels do not appear to be making further advances for now. Nevertheless, it represents a considerable loss of prestige. It was a dramatic incident, completely unforeseen, especially by the Russians who were brought in to enhance security.

DW: These Russian mercenaries reportedly withdrew without significant engagement. Meanwhile, Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), issued statements but offered no military assistance. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you explain this?

Ulf Laessing: With the Russians, it was always more about appearance than substance. They have approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, which is only a third of the French contingent that already struggled to pacify the entire country. Their brutal tactics have, in fact, exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern localities without a fight was a humiliation. Similarly, we saw little concrete action from Niger and Burkina Faso. They claimed to have provided air support, but in reality, Mali was largely on its own that day. This wasn’t surprising, as both Niger and Burkina Faso are grappling with their own severe jihadist threats. I don’t believe they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the desire.

DW: Is the solidarity often espoused by the three AES states weaker than perceived?

Ulf Laessing: Politically, they are very aligned and share many aspirations. However, they lack the political will and, more critically, the practical capabilities to implement these plans. While the three military leaders are united by a common ideology, these are also three of the world’s poorest nations. We must be realistic about the potential of such cooperation. This isn’t the European Union building infrastructure together or NATO providing mutual defense. These are three extremely impoverished countries fighting for their very survival.

DW: What could be a viable solution for Mali?

Ulf Laessing: On a positive note, the Malian people do not desire Sharia law or Islamist rule. This sentiment could have fueled protests, despite the inherent dangers and repression, but it hasn’t. I hope this provides a foundation for future action, leading to genuine negotiations with the more moderate elements among the jihadist factions, ultimately fostering dialogue.

DW: But what could be negotiated? Jihadists aim to control the country and impose Sharia law. How can one negotiate with such groups?

Ulf Laessing: I don’t believe JNIM is capable of controlling a major city like Bamako or the entire nation. Their primary goal is to be left undisturbed. They seek to control specific regions and establish arrangements with other entities. In Bamako, they might desire a government that leans slightly more towards Sharia and is open to negotiations. Unlike the Middle East, these jihadists are not foreign invaders seeking pure destruction. They are local individuals. Their grievances often stem from issues like access to water and land, which the jihadists exploit. At some point, I believe discussions must commence. Military action is necessary, but so is dialogue with moderate figures. There are already subtle pressures for this within Mali.

Mauritania faced a similar challenge. Their response involved both military force and strategic compromises. For example, alcohol is no longer permitted, and the country is officially an Islamic Republic. It’s not about adopting a full Taliban-style agenda, but perhaps finding common ground that satisfies the nation. Once instability is addressed, the state will naturally have greater capacity for action.

DW: And what do the Malian people truly want?

Ulf Laessing: The people do not want Sharia law imposed in Bamako. The lack of widespread protests or strong demands for the government’s resignation after the late April attacks demonstrates this. People understand that if the current government falls, the next one could be even more Islamist, and that is not what they desire. Despite all the criticisms leveled against the military government, it’s important to acknowledge that many still support it. They reject the alternatives: they don’t want jihadists, nor do they want the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as tied to France and Europe. Therefore, if no further major attacks occur, the current government is likely to remain in power, given the support it still commands.

DW: So, you don’t believe that the impression conveyed by social media is misleading, and that a significant portion of the population, particularly the youth, actually supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

Ulf Laessing: The average age in Mali is 15. Many young people are out of school and have no connection to Europe or France. They primarily get their information from social media, which is often saturated with propaganda, including disinformation disseminated by Russians to bolster the government. I still believe there is considerable support for the government. The late April attacks would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. This was also true last autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no significant protests materialized, clearly indicating that people do not wish to be governed by JNIM.

DW: Perhaps they are too preoccupied with basic survival, a situation now worsened by the blockade imposed on Bamako?

Ulf Laessing: Life has certainly become considerably more difficult, even before these recent attacks. People have grown resigned, losing all illusions about politicians. It’s also fair to say that political parties and established politicians have lost much credibility. Many of them have held power before, and conditions never improved. This leads many to believe: let’s give those currently in power another chance.