Following the synchronized attacks on April 25 and 26 targeting key Malian cities such as Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged within Mali’s security discussions: should negotiations commence with jihadist organizations? Given the significant scale of the offensive, jointly executed by Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Jnim), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), many analysts and experts now suggest that a purely military approach is no longer sufficient.
The offensive spread across Mali, from north to south, with unprecedented speed. Armed groups launched multiple coordinated assaults against state forces and symbols of authority in at least six cities, reaching as far as the outskirts of Bamako. For the first time, Jnim and the FLA visibly operated in concert. The FLA, established in November 2024 after the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast territory in northern Mali.
These recent attacks starkly revealed the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed factions. Across regional media and diplomatic circles, the prospect of negotiations with Jnim is now openly discussed, against a backdrop of increasing pressure on Bamako and a deepening regional quagmire. Despite the rapidly deteriorating security landscape, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue, affirming its exclusion of “any discussion with armed terrorist groups” and maintaining a strictly military posture.
Since late April, however, pressure on the regime has relentlessly intensified. Violence is escalating in the country’s central regions. Recently, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, were attacked. Local and security sources indicate that the combined death toll from these attacks reached between 70 and 80.
An unprecedented alliance, a stark warning
Jnim remains the primary driver of jihadist activity across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas comprising the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly constrained. These regimes, which seized power promising to restore security, are struggling to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, attacks have been relentlessly closing in on the capital for nearly a year.
« From July 2025, jihadists targeted gold panning sites and industrial facilities in western Mali. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively stifling the capital, » observes Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at Ifri. « This time, what is striking is not just the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate choice of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime, » adds Héni Nsaibia of Acled.
The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati profoundly shook the government. Concurrently, the loss of Kidal – recaptured in late 2023 and heralded as a major victory – represents a significant strategic setback.
The strategy of attrition
Even prior to this latest offensive, several experts had noted an evolution in Jnim’s strategy. « There is a clear intent to establish a more powerful leverage, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations, » Alain Antil had previously explained.
The jihadist group now aims to replicate nationally what it had been practicing locally: economic blockades, gradual encirclement of urban centers, and pressure on logistical supply routes. « Jnim is attempting to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako, » the researcher emphasizes.
For Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactic is a long-term endeavor: « They have chosen to weaken the government from within, favoring a strategy of protracted conflict and exploiting the military system’s internal divisions. » He further notes: « Jnim no longer makes the implementation of Sharia law a prerequisite for peace and now states its openness to negotiation. »
In this complex environment, the rivalry with the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and influence.
A once-taboo option gaining traction
Officially, Sahelian regimes reject any notion of dialogue. « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not an option. The discourse remains martial, with military response as the sole solution, » observes Alain Antil.
However, the reality on the ground is more intricate. Abuses committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by governmental forces and their Russian allies in Mali, almost five times the number attributed to Jnim, according to GI-TOC. This violence fuels resentment and facilitates jihadist recruitment.
States must commit to a brave compromise.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher
Faced with this impasse, an increasing number of experts advocate for a paradigm shift. « A purely military option is a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be combined with political negotiations, » believes Alain Antil of Ifri. Certain grievances expressed by jihadist groups – such as corruption, justice, and access to resources – could form a basis for discussion, without, however, overlooking their inherent violence.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa goes further: « States must commit to a brave compromise. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political arena to expose their limitations. » Yet, he sets clear boundaries: « The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »
As jihadist offensives intensify, the concept of negotiation is transitioning from an unacceptable heresy to a plausible political hypothesis. For many experts in Mali, the real question is no longer whether dialogue should occur, but rather how much longer Bamako can continue to resist it.
