The coordinated assaults by the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, represent a pivotal strategic shift since 2012. By simultaneously targeting Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré, these two groups exposed the inherent weaknesses of a security paradigm heavily reliant on external partnerships. The subsequent recapture of Kidal significantly undermines the Malian military junta’s claims to legitimacy and highlights the limitations of its Russian alliance in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the short term, the JNIM continues to wage a protracted war of attrition. This escalating instability poses a growing risk of regional contagion across the Sahel and extends its shadow towards the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea.
Bamako faces tightening pressure
The coordinated offensive by the jihadist group JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group FLA on April 25, 2026, marks a significant surge in insecurity across Mali. The simultaneous and unanticipated attacks on Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré are part of a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, which has intensified following the military junta’s assumption of power in August of that year.
Initially operating primarily in Mali’s northern rural areas, the JNIM has steadily enhanced its ability to strike more broadly, with increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its operations have expanded westward and southward into regions previously less affected. The group’s influence now extends beyond Malian borders, reaching coastal nations such as Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to the JNIM has surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, the FAMA, supported by the Russian group Africa Corps, suffered a notable defeat against a coalition of the JNIM and the CSD-DPA. Since then, the JNIM has launched a series of attacks on military bases in locations ranging from Tombouctou in the north, to Bamako in the south, and as far west as Kayes. Meanwhile, the FAMA have also strengthened their capabilities, notably with Bayraktar drones supplied by Turkey, although these are far from sufficient for comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, the JNIM has implemented a strategy to economically strangle Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys, aiming to gradually erode the government’s legitimacy. By directly impacting the population’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, the JNIM seeks to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as an alternative. The more the junta is weakened in rural areas and Bamako, the more the JNIM appears as a credible alternative and a viable governance option to the populace. The blockade of the capital effectively stages the state’s impotence. The JNIM aims to improve its image not by seizing the capital by force, but by demonstrating the existence of an alternative form of authority. In areas under its control, the group has established a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present a concrete alternative to an absent state.
A military seizure of the capital remains improbable for now, given the group’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, compared to a city that concentrates the majority of Mali’s security forces and infrastructure. The JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, isolated attacks against the Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts the Africa Corps base, could become more frequent. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by minimal state presence, offer fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that a military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective; the strategy relies on a primarily psychological war of attrition. This growing pressure on Bamako also serves to concentrate the Malian Armed Forces’ responses there, thereby easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s recapture undermines the junta’s legitimacy
The April 25 attacks underscore this rise in power. In Kati, the heart of Mali’s military command, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was struck. In Kidal, the JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which had been recaptured in 2023 by FAMA and Wagner in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unparalleled since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether the FAMA will be able to retake the city in the coming weeks.
This recapture of Kidal by the JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before ideological divergences led to their split. The JNIM advocates for the establishment of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels pursue an autonomist agenda focused on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this fracture, contested by both sides. These differences persist today, but the identification of common adversaries – the junta and its Russian partner – has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement had already circulated as early as March 2025. According to jihadist movement expert Wassim Nasr, negotiations to combine efforts reportedly took place in December 2024. Whether this opportunistic coalition will endure and successfully maintain control of Kidal remains to be seen.
These attacks occurred despite reports that a truce was to be signed in late March 2026 between the JNIM and the Malian government. This agreement reportedly involved the release of a number of jihadists in exchange for lifting the fuel blockade on Bamako. Mali subsequently denied releasing 200 jihadists, casting doubt on the reality of such an accord. Regardless of its existence, it clearly failed to halt the JNIM’s offensive momentum.
On April 28, the JNIM announced the start of a “total siege” targeting Bamako and demanded that the Russians permanently depart the territory. The following day, its spokesperson Mohamed Ramadane declared that the regime would fall and that the group intended to “liberate” Gao, Tombouctou, and Ménaka. Such maximalist rhetoric suggests little inclination for immediate negotiation.
The blow to the junta is both political and military. The killing of the Defense Minister is a significant event. More critically, the withdrawal of Africa Corps from Kidal undermines the narrative upon which the regime had built its legitimacy since 2021: the promise of recovered sovereignty through a Russian partnership presented as structurally superior to the French presence. Wagner, and subsequently Africa Corps, were officially promoted by the junta as the appropriate response to the country’s insecurity and a guarantor of power. Kidal has fallen once more, and with it, the Russian security narrative begins to unravel.
While Africa Corps may have faltered against the rebels and jihadists, it has nonetheless succeeded in protecting the government and Assimi Goïta himself, thereby fulfilling part of its mandate. This setback weakens their position without necessarily signaling their ultimate demise in Mali or neighboring countries.
External alliances under scrutiny
However, one should not overestimate the JNIM’s immediate ambitions. The group does not necessarily benefit from the immediate collapse of the regime. A weakened but still-standing junta serves as a useful adversary, which helps bolster the JNIM’s own legitimacy among the populace. Conversely, a political vacuum could facilitate the return of international actors that the group seeks to exclude, and a direct confrontation with Russia could prove particularly costly given Russia’s potential military superiority and troop reserves. While the Russians lack the air superiority that French forces possessed during Operation Barkhane, Vladimir Putin could, if he chooses, deploy reinforcements to salvage his position.
In any event, a Russian disengagement does not appear imminent. Moscow swiftly reaffirmed its support for Bamako, and the Russian ambassador was received by Assimi Goïta in the days following the attacks. On Africa Corps’ Telegram channels, an aggressive communication campaign quickly emerged, displaying numerous combat images in an attempt to regain control of a narrative that was slipping away. Withdrawing from Mali, a showcase for the Russian security model in Africa via Wagner and then Africa Corps, would be an admission of defeat for Russia. The Kremlin will therefore seek to preserve its credibility, even if it means increasing its commitment.
It is also worth noting that the Russians are not the sole external supporters of the junta. Turkey, through the SADAT company, has reportedly been present in Mali since 2024, engaged in a dual mission of protecting the junta and training special forces. This arrangement likely played a role in securing the junta leader during the April 25 attacks. As the situation deteriorates, Ankara may be called upon to play an increasing role in regime protection. In a statement issued on May 1, the FLA spokesperson, Mohamed Ramadane, called on Turkey to “re-evaluate the nature of their engagement alongside the ruling junta in Bamako, in order to play a positive role in Mali.”
A reshaped Sahelian landscape
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has adopted a cautious stance. A communiqué was indeed issued on April 27 condemning the attacks, but neither Niger nor Burkina Faso intervened militarily. Yet, the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which founded the alliance in September 2023, includes a mutual assistance clause in the event of an attack on the sovereignty and integrity of member states. Article 6 specifically states:
- “Any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties shall be considered an aggression against the other Parties and shall entail a duty of assistance and relief from all Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force, to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance.”
Furthermore, during the meeting of Chiefs of Staff on April 16 and 17, 2026, the three countries had announced their intention to increase their unified force to 15,000 soldiers, up from the original 5,000. Facing the same jihadist threat within their own territories, Niger and Burkina Faso evidently did not deem it opportune to disperse their forces.
Further north, the situation could benefit Algeria. On one hand, the shift in the center of gravity of attacks towards central and southern Mali moves the threat’s epicenter away from Algeria’s historically vulnerable borders. On the other hand, Algiers has been pursuing a strategy of Sahelian re-engagement for several months. Evidence includes President Tiani’s state visit to Niger in February 2026, the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project crossing Niger, and the announcement of a 50 billion CFA franc program to modernize Burkina Faso’s infrastructure. Algiers views its influence in the Sahel as a natural extension of its sphere of influence. Its historical rival, Morocco, is advancing its own initiatives with the Atlantic Initiative, launched in 2023, which aims to offer landlocked Sahelian countries access to the Atlantic Ocean via Mauritania. The destabilization of the Malian junta provides Algiers with an opportunity to regain the initiative, even if relations between the two capitals remain strained, particularly due to Bamako’s alignment with Moroccan positions on Western Sahara.
The current configuration offers Algiers the advantage of a privileged channel for negotiation with the FLA, with whom it has historical ties. Under its auspices, the 2015 Algiers Accord was negotiated, a framework now largely obsolete but retaining symbolic value. While Algiers refuses dialogue with the JNIM, its access to the FLA could nonetheless facilitate mediation between the Tuareg rebels and Bamako. It is precisely as a mediator that Algiers could play a structuring role and appears to wish to reposition itself in the Sahel.
These attacks also occur as Washington attempts to re-engage with Bamako. In February 2026, Nick Checker, head of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, visited Mali to “express U.S. respect for Mali’s sovereignty.” This rapprochement is part of the new Trump administration’s approach to the three AES juntas to counter Russian influence. These attacks further destabilize an interlocutor with whom the United States is trying to reconnect.
Regional contagion: disparate impacts and evolving threats?
The April 25 attacks signal entry into a new phase: more coordinated, geographically diffuse, and now collaborative between two actors with distinct agendas. However, the risk of regional contagion does not manifest uniformly and requires distinguishing the specific logics of each actor.
The FLA, driven by a nationalist agenda centered on Azawad, has neither the calling nor the interest to operate beyond northern Mali. Its logic is territorial and identity-based, not transnational. It does not constitute a vector of destabilization for Burkina Faso, Niger, or the coastal states.
The JNIM, conversely, possesses a demonstrated regional projection capability. It operates in Burkina Faso and Niger, and is extending its pressure towards the Gulf of Guinea. A sustained weakening of the Malian Armed Forces, or even more so a collapse of the junta, would offer it an expanded sanctuary from which to intensify these operations. Burkina Faso and Niger, whose political survival is partly linked to that of Bamako, would be the first exposed to these developments.
This divergence of agendas raises the question of the durability of the coalition between the two groups. Their rapprochement rests on a common adversary rather than a shared political project. The coalition can endure as long as the war against the junta remains the priority objective. It will very likely fracture once the question of the aftermath arises, and control of Kidal will serve as an initial revealing test.
Further west, Sénégal and Mauritania, largely spared until now, are not immune. They represent the primary access routes for fuel and goods to landlocked Mali, axes that the JNIM is already actively targeting in the Kayes region. The JNIM does not pose an immediate existential threat to these countries, but the trajectory is concerning. Several attacks could occur at the borders, further exposing these economies to Mali’s security shifts.
In the Gulf of Guinea, the threat to Bénin and Togo, already experiencing incursions, follows a different logic. These countries are not directly menaced by the Malian situation, but by what it could trigger downstream. It is the instability of Burkina Faso, a border country, that constitutes the primary vector of contagion towards the coastal states. A further deterioration in Burkina Faso, made more probable by a collapse in Bamako, would be the most immediate threatening scenario for them.
However, the threat is not solely external. An internal coup in Mali cannot be ruled out. The junta has simultaneously intensified its internal repression, risking an acceleration of its own fragility. As Wassim Nasr emphasizes, this radicalization of the regime could reinforce the idea among opponents that the only way to remove the junta is through an internal overthrow. Such a scenario would offer the JNIM an additional window of opportunity to consolidate its gains. Ultimately, these attacks reveal the accumulated fragilities of a regional security system relying on external partners with contested results, and a Malian state whose legitimacy erodes as its capacity to protect its populations diminishes.
