Despite regime changes and radical geopolitical shifts, Niamey remains caught in a grinding war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignist break, the harsh truth endures: the terrorist threat on the ground has not receded.
Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état—and a single constant: bloodshed in the ‘three borders’ zone and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra, embodied by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), remains.
When the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) took power in July 2023, it vowed to restore security by expelling Western partners. Now the country faces a harsh return to reality: an assessment of a war that seems, for now, unwinnable.
The Issoufou-Bazoum era: The illusion of a Western shield
Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011-2021), Niger positioned itself as the anchor of Western strategy in the Sahel. As the Malian state crumbled next door, Niamey became the military hub for France (Operation Barkhane) and the United States (Agadez drone base).
His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, tried to add a layer of political flexibility:
- A ‘hand outstretched’ approach, initiating dialogues with some repentant fighters.
- Massive investment in training Nigerien special forces.
The downside: While this strategy prevented the country’s collapse, it never managed to eliminate the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fueled deep frustration within parts of the army and population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty with insufficient results.
Tiani’s gamble: Sovereignty tested by bullets
By overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP justified their takeover by ‘the continuous deterioration of the security situation.’ What followed is well known: a dramatic break with Paris and Washington, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.
On the communications front, the change is radical. The military leadership exalts national pride and promises a purely military response, freed from Western ‘hidden agendas.’
The harsh reality on the ground
Yet reports from international observers and strategic studies centres concur: the departure of Western forces created an immediate capability vacuum, particularly in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance.
Complex attacks are multiplying, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien army (FDS) garrisons and causing heavy losses. The economic blockade imposed in some regions and diplomatic isolation complicate the logistical financing of a war that costs millions of dollars per day.
Why is Niger stuck in this dead end?
The common mistake of successive regimes—whether civilian or military—lies in treating a crisis that is primarily political and social with military means alone. Two grand visions have broken their teeth on this:
On one hand, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integrating into the international security architecture. Its major weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of the Nigerien public.
On the other, the Tiani doctrine favors a total geopolitical rupture and a martial sovereignism embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible on the ground: an immediate loss of cutting-edge technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganization.
In both cases, the root causes remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and intercommunal conflicts (notably between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.
Whether waged to the tune of international cooperation or under the banners of AES sovereignism, the war in Niger cannot be won by arms alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticize his predecessors’ record, but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services (schools, justice, health clinics) into insecure areas, Niger risks seeing this war effectively lost in the long term.
