The precise definition of a political upheaval often shifts, influenced by the international community’s discretion and the perceived interests of neighboring states. Notably, the selection of interim President Michel Kafando bypassed constitutional norms. Consequently, Burkina Faso is set to operate for at least twelve months under a provisional institutional framework.
Much like an intricate construction, the institutions of this transitional government are gradually materializing. Since the emergence of military uniforms on the public stage, immediately following the swift departure of the “Sphinx of Kosyam” (referring to Blaise Compaoré), a palpable sense of calm has begun to settle over Ouagadougou.
Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from obscurity, swiftly occupied the political void, asserting all the prerogatives of a head of state. His true intentions ignited widespread speculation. How did he manage to embed himself among protestors and political party leaders so effectively? Many questioned if his deployment to the Place de la Révolution was a premeditated strategy, possibly coordinated between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré, to retain control. Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the people’s cause naturally generated considerable distrust and suspicion. The immediate actions taken by the military, such as suspending the Constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, amplified fears of a looming junta, threatening to strip the populace, who had sacrificed greatly, of their hard-won victory.
The African Union, true to form, promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. In response, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived to assess the situation with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedent set by previous military takeovers, such as those involving Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali, undoubtedly compelled Burkinabé officers to exercise caution. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted exit from the crisis risked international isolation and burgeoning unpopularity.
Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, meticulously outlined in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the Executive as President of the Transition, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who spearheaded the popular struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President of the Republic. This arrangement was a fixed-term contract, set to conclude in November 2015, marking the end of President Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.
For the appointment of the Head of State, each vital national component – the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen for consideration:
The opposition and civil society put forward two prominent journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ outspoken criticism of the former regime. The army presented a broader range of candidates, diversifying profiles: Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso, a diplomat Michel Kafando, and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, Archbishop Ouédraogo, initially a strong contender, declared his disinterest in the role, preferring to focus on his ecclesiastical duties.
The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage due to their extensive experience in major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the land of the “Upright Man” (Burkina Faso), an invisible divide often separates society into those for or against Thomas Sankara. This implicit cleavage subtly influences every political figure throughout their career. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Thomas Sankara’s government, under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements over the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposed ideologies.
A career within an international institution offers a dual benefit: a significant boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, will temporarily set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in peril! He will assume the dual roles of President of the Transition and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual mandate streamlines diplomatic channels, providing a single interlocutor and effectively circumventing Prime Minister Isaac Zida.
The evolving situation in Burkina Faso has been closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, which currently chairs ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical considerations. On the day of Michel Kafando’s investiture, several heads of state – from Mauritania (African Union), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a move to rehabilitate Burkina Faso. Did this robust representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who have not received a popular mandate, which is currently the case in Burkina Faso. The international community, therefore, found a way to legitimize the coup and establish a semblance of constitutional order. This ensures that American reconnaissance aircraft will remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as strategic footholds for monitoring the Sahel region.
Out of 26 ministerial positions, the army secured four pivotal portfolios: the Prime Minister also holds the Defense ministry; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Minister of Security in 2011, now oversees Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was given the post of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned a few days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized him for having “shelved” the Norbert Zongo case during his tenure as a former prosecutor.
The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He secured 71 out of 90 votes from his peers. The next crucial steps involve establishing and fully implementing the institutions and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), a new electoral code, and organic laws.
What are the key missions for this brief transitional period?
Since early December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate are significant. More than 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the country of the “Upright Man” is finally ready to embark on a journey of catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s first decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida is equally committed, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek Blaise Compaoré’s extradition from Morocco.
Through a series of public declarations, the current leaders have effectively opened Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically demand an extended period, likely surpassing the transitional phase. Were these statements intended to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been his priority. In line with this, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s chief of staff and Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
The question remains whether Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma will maintain loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré. Burkina Faso managed to defuse the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, without major complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial skirmishes could have triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to focus on holding elections rather than potentially implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by exhuming the Sankara file?
How can a “witch hunt” be avoided? Two general managers of major national enterprises, deemed close to the ousted president’s family, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation honored the seven individuals who fell under gunfire during the events of October 30th and 31st; they now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? Now that all institutions are established, political figures and parties are set to take center stage. No prominent political leader opted to occupy a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in future general elections. Candidates for the presidential elections are already in the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT also provided an opportunity for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is certainly poised to commence at the very beginning of 2015.
