Emmanuel Macron has opted for a candid assessment to describe the current state of relations between France and the military regimes in the Sahel. Declaring that Paris has been “repaid with ingratitude,” the French head of state articulated, in unusually direct language, the conclusion of a diplomatic cycle that began over a decade ago. This statement unequivocally targets the juntas currently governing in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey—three capitals that have successively informed France of the termination of bilateral military cooperation.
A presidential indictment solidifies the sahelian rupture
The tone adopted by the occupant of the Élysée Palace sharply contrasts with the diplomatic caution typically exercised when addressing African partners. By emphasizing France’s significant efforts, which came at a cost of considerable human and financial losses, Emmanuel Macron intends to place the responsibility for this diplomatic breakdown squarely on the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups of 2020, 2022, and 2023. His remarks also cater to a domestic audience, as the Sahelian situation is widely perceived in France as a major strategic setback following the forced withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.
Nevertheless, the president’s chosen words risk further complicating an already precarious equation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon condemning a French presence deemed intrusive, even neo-colonial. Each grievance-laden statement from the Élysée inadvertently fuels the sovereignty-focused rhetoric championed by colonels Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré, and Abdourahamane Tiani. European chancelleries, closely observing these developments, fear that such direct language could also impede their remaining diplomatic channels with Sahelian capitals.
The Alliance of Sahel States confronts French withdrawal
Since the establishment of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) in September 2023, which evolved into a confederation in July 2024, the three military regimes have accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. Withdrawing from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), fostering closer ties with Moscow through Africa Corps (the successor to Wagner), and initiating outreach to Ankara and Tehran, Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey are rapidly repositioning themselves geopolitically. France, which once maintained a notable economic footprint through entities like the Franc CFA, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, now sees its influence diminishing.
Concretely, the announced departure of the last French troops from Chad and Senegal by late 2024 marks the completion of Paris’s military disengagement from the Sahelo-Saharan front. The French military presence in West Africa, which numbered over 5,000 personnel in 2020, is now reduced to a residual footprint, primarily focused on training and intelligence. This contraction fundamentally transforms France’s long-standing model of influence, previously anchored in force projection.
A double-edged rhetoric for Paris
By publicly citing the ingratitude of its African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a post-colonial interpretation that has already gained significant traction among Sahelian public opinion, particularly urban and younger demographics. The term, whether intended or not, harks back to a paternalistic framing that the French executive had, since the Ouagadougou speech of November 2017, ostensibly worked to dismantle. The stark contrast between initial promises of renewing the Franco-African relationship and the current reality of rupture is now undeniable.
Furthermore, the presidential statement comes at a time when Paris is striving to reconfigure its African partnerships around states considered more stable, from Morocco to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritania. This strategy of re-orienting focus away from the Sahel necessitates measured public discourse, lest it contaminate the entire spectrum of diplomatic relationships. Several African diplomats, even in allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they perceive as an overly personal register.
In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, these developments are being closely watched, as they underscore France’s difficulty in cleanly closing one chapter without reopening old wounds. The question remains: how can Paris restore its credibility as an attentive partner on the continent while grappling with a Sahelian outcome it believes has been unjustly received?
