There is something absurd about this picture: public health facilities running out of rapid HIV tests for more than a year, patients being sent home without screening, while Moroccan producers have kits ready to deliver within days of an order. The shortage, reported by several health professionals and patients, and confirmed by an investigation, is not simply a logistics issue. It is a symptom of a deeper dysfunction: public procurement in the health sector, where national preference, though written into law, remains a dead letter.
Moroccan law is explicit. Decree No. 2.22.431, which governs public procurement, provides a mechanism for national preference. It stipulates that the technical specifications of a tender must be based on performance and function, not on a specific brand, origin or patent. Violating this principle is, according to Abdelhay Rhorba, a professor at Hassan II University of Casablanca and a researcher in administrative law on public procurement, legally actionable.
“Inserting excessively precise technical conditions or demanding certifications held only by a particular competitor constitutes a violation of the principle of equal opportunity,” he explains, “and can amount to an abuse of power.” Moroccan administrative courts, he adds, assess such situations based on a simple criterion: the unjustified exclusionary effect. In other words, if a set of specifications, even if formally correct, results in excluding local producers, it can be challenged.
Recourses exist: an administrative appeal before the National Commission for Public Procurement before the contract is awarded, then a referral to the administrative courts within sixty days. In cases of suspected corruption, provisions of Moroccan criminal law on influence peddling can also be invoked.
But one must have the means to fight against an administration.
On the ground, the reality described by sector actors is blunt. The special specifications documents (CPS) — technical documents that define the requirements of a contract — are, according to several concordant sources, drafted based on foreign products already in use, perpetuating old contracts without taking into account new national production capabilities.
A Moroccan manufacturer of medical devices, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes a Kafkaesque situation. His lab sells its products in several African countries but accounts for less than 2% of the Moroccan public market in its segment. “CPS should be based on Moroccan products, which is not done today,” he explains.
When a sector player seeks clarification from the project owner to point out that a tender is biased toward a foreign product, the response is often silence — or inaction. The public contract remains unchanged.
And the contradiction does not stop at the doors of the Ministry of Health. It goes all the way up to the heart of the government itself. While the Ministry of Finance recently raised customs duties on certain imported medical devices to encourage national production, the Ministry of Health continues, according to sector sources, to buy more expensive imported products, ignoring local equivalents available at competitive prices.
Contacted, the Ministry of Health’s Directorate for the Supply of Medicines and Health Products offered its reading of the situation. It says it acts “in strict compliance with the current regulatory framework” and states that tenders are “open to all operators meeting the required conditions, with particular attention paid to operators established in Morocco.” However, a nuance applies: the ministry specifies that this requirement concerns the location of companies, not the country of manufacture of the products. In other words, an importer domiciled in Morocco is treated equally with a Moroccan manufacturer.
The case of the HIV test is particularly telling. According to information gathered, a stockout reportedly lasted more than a year in some facilities. The ministry confirms, in its written response, that “temporary tensions have indeed been observed in some health facilities,” attributing them to “delays related to public procurement procedures and disruptions affecting supply chains at the international level.” Tenders are currently underway to secure supply, and “complementary alternatives” are being studied.
An explanation that leaves several sector observers skeptical. If local producers have available stocks and approved products, why could shortages have lasted several months without them being urgently solicited?
On the question of negotiated contracts, the ministry is firm: “No recourse to negotiated procedures has been made in this context.” The acquisition procedures for 2025 were reportedly conducted “exclusively through tenders, in strict compliance with current regulations.” This statement directly contradicts information reported by several sources close to the matter. We are not in a position to decide at this stage, in the absence of official documents made public.
Recourse to negotiated contracts is only legal under limited conditions: extreme unforeseeable urgency, justified technical exclusivity, or failure of a tender. Decree No. 2.22.431 requires a written justification and proof of the absence of an alternative, recalls Abdelhay Rhorba. “If not, recourse to this procedure is considered illegal.”
Health sovereignty: a still-distant ideal
Behind the question of public procurement lies the issue of Morocco’s health sovereignty. Professor Jaafar Heikel, a renowned infectious disease specialist, adds an important nuance: the absence of rapid tests does not mean total inability to diagnose. Public and private laboratories can, in most cases, perform standard biological analyses. But the value of rapid tests lies elsewhere: in their accessibility, speed, and ability to reach populations that do not frequent conventional facilities.
“NGOs like OPALS or ALCS play an extremely important role in HIV screening in Morocco,” he stresses. “They need these tests to reach people who might not go to a lab.” The interruption of their supply is therefore not without consequence for the field response.
On the issue of national production, Professor Heikel is clear: “When these locally manufactured tests are validated by state structures, it is very interesting for the country, for financial reasons first and because it allows progress toward health sovereignty.”
2030 in peril?
Morocco has adopted the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets: 95% of people living with HIV must know their status, 95% of diagnosed people must be on treatment, and 95% of treated people must have an undetectable viral load. These goals aim to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. These ambitions rely precisely on widespread, rapid, and accessible screening.
“When there is no test, fewer people are screened and the disease has more chance to spread,” sums up a manufacturer. Professor Heikel shares this view: “We will achieve the 95-95-95 targets faster if we have rapid tests and validated national production.”
The Ministry of Health says it remains “fully mobilized to ensure the continuity of screening services.” A mobilization that sector actors are waiting to see translated into facts and into the special specifications documents.
Today, our sources no longer hesitate to voice their questions out loud: are some members of the conformity and validation committees for tenders acting to protect their own interests, or those of established foreign suppliers, in defiance of ministerial directives?
An investor who develops an approved product, responds to a tender, and is systematically rejected will not do so forever. The risk is simple: discouraging investment in national production at the very moment Morocco needs it most. And continuing to buy abroad what the country is capable of manufacturing itself.
