The Sahel has slipped from global headlines, yet its crises rage on unabated. While international attention shifted to conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Congo, the decade-long security and political turmoil in the Sahel has only deepened. The region, once perceived as a manageable challenge, now stands as the global epicenter of jihadist violence, with civilian casualties soaring and authoritarian regimes entrenching their grip on power.
Three nations—Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger—have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in response to this escalation. Yet their military-led governments have failed to curb the jihadist advance. Instead, they’ve presided over a dangerous convergence of rising extremism, state repression and collapsing governance, leaving civilians caught in a deadly crossfire.
escalating jihadist violence and state failure
The Sahel’s descent into chaos is most evident in the staggering toll of violence. Once considered Africa’s least affected region by extremist groups, it now records the highest number of jihadist-related fatalities worldwide. In 2024 alone, over 11,200 people were killed in attacks across the three AES countries, a threefold increase since 2021. Shockingly, security forces—including national armies and foreign mercenaries—may have caused even more civilian deaths than the armed groups themselves, a grim testament to the erosion of state authority.
While the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate, remains the dominant threat, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) has intensified attacks, particularly in Niger and Mali. Both groups have adopted increasingly sophisticated tactics, including coordinated assaults on military targets in urban centers and the use of drones and improvised explosives.
Mali: caught between jihadists and separatists
Mali’s security landscape has deteriorated dramatically since the 2023 expulsion of the UN stabilization mission (MINUSMA). The junta, backed by Russian Wagner forces, has sought to reclaim the north from both jihadists and Tuareg separatists. Yet its strategy has backfired spectacularly.
In October 2023, Malian forces retook the rebel stronghold of Kidal, a symbolic victory that masked deeper weaknesses. The following July, a coordinated ambush by JNIM and the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawad (CSP-DPA) near the Algerian border resulted in the loss of 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries—Wagner’s deadliest defeat in the region to date.
The junta’s inability to secure Bamako was exposed in September 2024 when JNIM launched simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and the presidential airport, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying the presidential jet. These high-profile strikes underscored the regime’s vulnerability while deliberately sparing civilian targets—a calculated move to win local support. In contrast, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province governs through fear, targeting markets and villages indiscriminately.
The human cost is devastating. In July 2024, a wedding massacre in the Mopti region left 40 dead. A month later, Malian drone strikes in retaliation for the Tinzaouaten ambush killed 21 civilians. By early 2025, jihadists had ambushed a military convoy escorting civilians near Gao, killing 50. Despite these setbacks, public opinion surveys reveal a surprising confidence in the armed forces, suggesting deep societal divisions.
Burkina Faso: when the state arms its people
Since the 2022 coup, Burkina Faso has become a byword for state collapse. In 2024, government forces lost control of 60% of the territory, with JNIM operating in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. The human toll has been catastrophic: civilian deaths surged by 68% between 2022 and 2023, with 2024 on track to surpass that grim record.
The August 2024 massacre in Barsalogho epitomized the chaos. As civilians dug trenches to defend the city under army orders, JNIM fighters descended upon them, killing between 130 and 600 people—the deadliest single attack in Burkina Faso’s history. State forces, meanwhile, have been accused of grave abuses, including the summary execution of 223 civilians in February 2024 and the mutilation of corpses by soldiers.
The junta’s response—arming civilian volunteers known as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)—has fueled ethnic tensions and blurred the lines between state, militia and jihadist violence. Since 2022, over 50,000 VDP members have been recruited, often from specific communities, with some forcibly conscripted from opposition ranks. The strategy has backfired: VDP villages have become jihadist targets, and the cycle of revenge attacks has militarized Burkinabè society. With over 2 million internally displaced persons, Burkina Faso now hosts the highest number of displaced people in the region.
Niger: the illusion of stability
While Niger has fared slightly better than its AES neighbors, the past two years have seen a sharp deterioration. Since the 2023 coup, the military junta has escalated operations against jihadist groups, but civilian casualties have tripled. In 2024, state forces launched 51 attacks on armed groups—nearly double the 2023 figure—while jihadist offensives targeted both civilians and security personnel.
March 2024 saw 23 soldiers killed in Tillabéri, followed by a December attack that left 39 civilians dead near the Burkina Faso border. In March 2025, an Islamic State mosque bombing in the west killed 44 people. Though Niger remains relatively more stable, the trend is unmistakably downward.authoritarian drift: controlling information in a failing state
Faced with territorial losses, the AES regimes have turned to information warfare as a tool of control. Independent and foreign media outlets have been banned or suspended, journalists expelled or arrested, and civil society organizations shut down. The crackdown extends to political parties, which have been suspended or silenced.
In Mali, RFI and France 24 were banned in 2022, followed by the closure of private broadcaster Joliba TV in late 2024. Burkina Faso has expelled foreign journalists, suspended RFI and France 24, and targeted outlets like TV5Monde for airing critical content. Niger joined the trend, suspending the same French media within a week of the 2023 coup. Since then, local reporters covering security issues have faced intimidation and imprisonment, while opposition figures—including former President Mohamed Bazoum—remain detained without trial.
The information blackout extends beyond borders. Niger’s junta has restricted foreign passport holders’ movements, detaining travelers at Niamey’s airport for days. Such measures not only suppress dissent but also manipulate public perception. In October 2024, Burkina Faso’s government claimed to control 70% of its territory—a figure matching independent estimates of jihadist influence, revealing the extent of state propaganda.
stagnant transitions: power without elections
The AES regimes have systematically delayed democratic transitions, using constitutional reforms to extend their rule. In Mali, the junta initially promised elections in February 2022 but has since pushed the timeline to 2029, citing technical delays and census controversies. Burkina Faso’s Captain Traoré followed suit, extending his transition to 60 months—effectively keeping him in power until 2029. Niger’s junta, though initially resistant to setting a date, eventually recommended a renewable five-year transition, with junta leader Tchiani promoting himself to army general upon assuming the presidency in March 2025.
These prolonged transitions serve a dual purpose: they consolidate military rule and enable deeper ties with non-Western partners, such as Russia, which has pledged support for the AES’s new joint force. The EU and its member states must recognize this new reality if they seek to re-engage meaningfully in the Sahel.
the Sahel’s far-reaching consequences
The Sahel’s instability is not a regional issue—it’s a global one. Over 52.7 million people in West Africa faced acute food insecurity between June and August 2025, while 3.1 million were internally displaced across the Sahel by March 2025. These crises transcend borders, fueling migration, radicalization and regional insecurity.
Yet the Sahel remains underreported, partly due to Western disengagement and media repression. The silence is deceptive: the region is not stable—it’s in freefall. As the EU reconsiders its approach, it must ask critical questions: What are its priorities in the Sahel? What can realistically be achieved? And with which partners?
The time for half-measures is over. A coordinated, inclusive strategy—prioritizing humanitarian aid, human rights and sustainable governance—is essential to prevent the Sahel’s collapse from destabilizing the wider continent and beyond.
